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ABSTRACT
SUPPLY CHAIN RISK ANALYSIS
by
Venkata R. Kallepalli
A new decision support system is proposed and developed that will help sustaining
business in a high-risk business environment. The system is developed as a web
application to better integrate the supply chain entities and to provide a common platform
for performing risk analysis in a supply chain. The system performs a risk analysis and
calculates risk factor with each activity in the supply considering its interrelationship with
other activities. Bayesian networks along with fault tree structures are embedded in the
system and logical rules are used to perform a qualitative fault tree analysis, as the data
required to calculate the frequency of occurrence is rarely available.
The developed system guides the risk assessment process: from asset
identification to consequence analysis before estimating the risk factor associated with
each activity in the supply chain. The system is tested with a sample case study on a
highly explosive product. Results show that the system is capable of identifying high-risk
threats.
The system further needs to be developed to add a safeguard analysis module and
to enable automatic data extraction from the enterprise resource planning and legacy
databases. It is expected that the system on complete development and induction will help
supply chain managers to manage business risks and operations more efficiently and
effectively by providing a complete picture of the risk environment and safeguards
required to reduce the risk level.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
A supply chain is a complex network of business relationships extending from raw
material suppliers, component manufacturers, and logistics operators to manufacturers,
retailers and consumers. The supply chain starts with customer's requirements and ends
with multiple tiers of suppliers and service providers. These chains involve a constant
flow of cash, material and information and aim at generating revenues by selling
products/services to customers. Continuity of the supply chain operations is of utmost
importance and any disruption can severely impact business operations and product
flows. Managing disruptions efficiently and effectively has become the key factor in
deciding the success of a business.
Supply chains are as old as trade and the roots could be traced back to the barter
system. Even though supply chains always existed, their importance was not realized
until early 1960's [1]. After 1960, rapid strides were taken to improve efficiency and
effectiveness. Prior to 1960's, each business entity worked independently. And, resources
were plarmed and optimized for each unit without considering other entities in the chain.
As a result, each company used to maintain a safety stock to account for the uncertainties
associated with other business partners. After 1960, the importance of the supply chains
was realized and management principles were extended beyond an individual business to
consider the supply chain as a single system. Due to the improved collaboration and
1
2coordination, inventory levels were drastically reduced resulting in significant cost
savings.
The Japanese formulated the just-in-time (JIT) philosophy that emphasizes near
zero inventory levels to enhance the cost effectiveness of the chain. The fierce
competition in the market, with ever increasing customer expectations for better quality
products at lower cost, resulted in adoption of the just-in-time philosophy.
Today, many companies operate with inventories less than for a couple of hours.
Also, companies reduced their supplier base drastically to reduce overhead and order
processing costs and to get quantity discounts. Xerox, for example, reduced its supplier
base from 5000 to 400 between 1981 and 1985 and reduced costs by 10% and lead-time
by 34 weeks [2].
The just-in-time philosophy is an ideal production practice if the flow variability
is low. However, the terrorist events of 9-11, labor strike at 19 West Coast Ports and the
black out in the Northeast coast have led companies to reassess of the robustness of their
supply chains and the impact of disruptions on production flow. Due to the terrorist
attacks, borders were sealed and security was tightened. Many companies had to suspend
operations, as they were unable to procure components from overseas suppliers or
experienced prolonged delays in arrival of the shipment. Toyota suspended operations, as
one of its suppliers did not receive the steering sensors from a German supplier due to
closure of the borders [3]. Even though companies were not directly targeted, heavy
economic losses resulted due to precautionary measures taken by the government to
protect people from further attacks.
3Questions like what would be the response of the supply chain if one of the ports
or a production plant were compromised are becoming increasingly relevant. These kinds
of extraordinary events are extremely difficult to predict when and where they will occur,
but understanding these events has become extremely important to business survivability
in a highly competitive market. However, these types of extraordinary events are not the
only threats to the supply chain. But, minor events like delay in arrival of goods or an
accident at a facility have the potential to disrupt the entire chain, as inventory levels are
almost zero.
Supply chain vulnerabilities always existed but were mostly ignored in the past
due to economic considerations. For example prior to September 11, Ericsson reported a
loss of 1.8 billion US dollars and lost market share by 4% due to complete dependence on
Philips for a computer chip. Due to a fire accident in one of their plants, Philips was not
able to supply computer chips to Ericsson. The disadvantage of having single source
suppliers became apparent to Ericsson [4].
Apart from maintaining continuity of the business chain, ensuring the safety and
security of employees and products is equally important. Events like the Bhopal gas
tragedy or the Chernobyl nuclear accident in the former Soviet Union are totally
unacceptable [4]. Employees, assets and operations need to be protected.
Today, managers are confronted with many operational and business questions.
For example, if sole sourcing is a high-risk proposition then how many alliances should
be made? Should production facilities be centralized to reduce costs or should they be
dispersed to improve security. If near zero inventory level poses a significant threat then
what should be the ideal inventory level. In the past, managers relied on their experience
4to answer these questions. But today, with constantly changing business environment and
new threats emerging every day, it may not be possible to continue relying on experience.
Building inventories or constructing safeguards along the entire chain may ensure
safety and continuity of operations, however, the economic advantage of JIT may be lost.
Industry has come a long way in implementing innovative techniques to improve
productivity and cost effectiveness. Abandoning all of those techniques at this point of
time may not be advisable since billions of dollars have been invested.
Instead of building inventories to offset disruptions, new decision tools need to be
developed that allow flexible supply chain management in a rapidly changing
environment. For example, if a storm is expected to hit one of the logistics links then the
inventory levels can be temporarily increased or the shipment can be rerouted to reduce
risk and maintain business continuity. The capability to make real time decisions and to
operate flexibly will allow companies to reap the benefits of being just-in-time while
managing disruptions efficiently. The key factor to develop such a system lies in
understanding the core vulnerabilities and how assets and operations should be protected
to avoid disruptions in the operations.
Risk analysis is a classical subject that could help answer some of the questions
that industry is facing today. Risk analysis is a very powerful tool for decision-making
under uncertainty and has been successfully applied to many industries, especially the
nuclear and aerospace industries. Risk analysis aims at identifying and quantifying the
threats and their consequences. It follows a system analysis approach to identify the
threats and associated causal events in the system that could disrupt the system. Such an
analysis not only identifies system threats but also enables a better understanding of the
5vulnerabilities of the system. Knowledge of system threats, vulnerabilities and
consequences will allow risk-aware and more rational decision-making.
1.2 Research Needs
Risk analysis techniques in the past have been mainly focused toward stand-alone
systems like a nuclear facility or product failures in aerospace industry. Even though the
underlying concepts of risk analysis are system independent, the direct application of
existing techniques developed is restricted by the very nature of the supply chain.
In a supply chain, the business units are interdependent and performance of one
unit depends on the other. These interdependencies are very complex and often difficult
to understand and model. For example, consider two supplier's A and B, who supply two
different components to manufacturer C. If there is a work halt at A's facility then B's
business will also get affected even though they are not directly related. This is a simple
and straightforward example of interdependence. Consider the business of B getting
affected due to a work halt at the nth tier supplier of A. These kinds of interrelationships
need to be considered while analyzing risks. These interrelationships make supply chain
risk analysis much more challenging. A recent report by the National Research Council
recognizes the gaps in existing systems analysis, risk modeling and network techniques to
handle the complexity associated with assessing infrastructure security issues. Basic
research is required to better understand and to model this type of complex
interrelationships, supply chain vulnerabilities and chain dynamics.
The global nature of the supply chain also posses a significant challenge in the
risk analysis of the supply chain. Supply chains often extend across corporate and
6national boundaries. Even though the businesses are interdependent, they work
independently and exchange a limited amount of data with one another. For example, the
manufacturer might have information on the status of the shipment from the supplier but
rarely has information on the problems/ threats that the supplier is facing. Without much
supplier information, the manufacturer may not be able to perform a complete and
effective risk analysis, as his operations are dependent on the supplier. Data availability is
a key factor that needs to be addressed. The supply chain units need to be better
integrated horizontally as well as vertically to improve information flow.
Risk analysis is a very data intensive subject and often this hinders the motivation
to perform the analysis. However, the data required to perform the analysis may be
residing in one of the databases and could be extracted without much effort. For example,
the probability of work stoppage due to inventory shortages is directly dependent on the
inventory level in a plant. This data (inventory level) resides in an Enterprise Resource
Plarming (ERP) database and could be extracted automatically to estimate the probability
of a work stoppage. New tools are required that would identify the data source and
automate data extraction.
The inherent dynamic nature of the supply chain and continuously changing
business environment also make risk analysis of a supply chain more challenging and
distinctively different from traditional risk analysis. Risk analysis of the supply chain
should be performed on a continuous real time basis as opposed to one time risk
assessment. Risk levels need to be constantly updated based on the new information as
and when it flows into the system. It may not be possible to monitor manually, requiring
the process to be automated.
7Logical inference techniques like Bayesian networks have the capability to
calculate new threat levels based on new available information. These inference
techniques combine new and prior information to deduce an inference. However, which
inference technique is ideal for risk analysis of supply chains has still not been resolved.
Research is needed to identify the best technique for analyzing risks in a supply chain.
Computer based risk analysis systems are highly sought due to their immense
computational capability. Presently, none of the risk assessment software available in the
market has the capability to assess risks in a supply chain. Software's like Site Profiler
and Buddy System from Digital Sandbox and Counter Measures, Inc, respectively, assess
risks in a stand-alone facility. Neither software, however, has the capability to account for
the complex interrelationships that exist among business partners while analyzing risks.
Thereby, rendering them ineffective for risk analysis of a supply chain.
Clearly, basic research is required to better understand the supply chain
vulnerabilities, formalize the risk assessment procedure for a supply chain and to bridge
the research gaps to build a robust streamlined next-generation risk analysis and
management system. The system has to be extremely reliable and flexible to incorporate
any changes in the supply chain configuration. Also, it should enhance operational
efficiency and effectiveness while analyzing and mitigating risks.
81.3 Envisioned System
A new decision tool, Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Management System (SCRAMS),
is envisioned that will help reduce the risk level in a supply chain. By providing a
complete picture of the risk environment, the supply chain manager will be better able to
make risk aware decisions. The architecture of the tool is given in Figure 1.1.
The primary objective of supply chain risk analysis and management system is to
assess and estimate business risks in a supply chain. The tool will be built upon the
existing standards MIL-STD-882D guidelines from the United Stated Department of
Defense and driven by a rule-based structure to better understand vulnerabilities and
assess risks. The analysis framework will be developed using a Bayesian/Fuzzy Logic
structure with rules derived from previous risk assessment reports. The web-enabled
architecture will be knowledge based with modules for extracting computer-aided design
data, simulating consequences and customizing standard report generators. Supply Chain
Risk Analysis and Management System may also interface with SAP enterprise resource
plarming and management system and potentially with other legacy databases to extract
supplier, production and material data relevant for the threat hazard assessment.
Given the product design data in Pro-Engineer format, the system will
automatically generate the bill of materials and product structure by extracting the data
directly from the Pro-Engineer model. The system will then identify the suppliers and
construct the supply chain model by extracting data from the corporate, legacy and ERP
databases. From the supply chain model, the system will identify assets and processes,
and screen and evaluate them to identify high-priority assets and processes. Then, the
system will identify and present to the analyst a list of plausible threats against each asset
9using the system knowledge. Once the analyst selects the threats then the system will run
a simulation module to determine the consequences. The risk factor with each asset will
be estimated to identify high-risk assets. For the identified high-risk assets, an interactive
safeguard simulation module will be run to identify the most cost-effective and efficient
safeguards. Risk factor will be again estimated with the safeguards in place to check if
the new risk level is acceptable or not. If the risk level is acceptable then the system will
keep monitoring the supply chain for new threats and vulnerabilities.
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1.4 Thesis Objectives
Development of such a system can be broadly divided into three different phases. They
are risk assessment, safeguard analysis and system integration. The first phase estimates
the risk factor, second phase identifies safeguards to reduce risk level and finally the
system integration phase integrates the modules developed in the first two phases with
the ERP system and other legacy databases. This thesis focuses on the first phase and
aims at developing and implementing a framework to assess risks in a supply chain.
First, an effort will be made to understand the supply chain elements and their
vulnerabilities to develop a risk assessment procedure. The supply chain elements will be
identified and modeled to construct a supply chain network model. Each of the network
elements will be further studied to understand their core vulnerabilities and to develop a
risk assessment procedure. Also, an effort will be made to keep the procedure consistent
with the existing risk assessment techniques in related fields. Second, fault trees and
Bayesian networks will be explored to model the causal interrelationships that exist
among business units. Finally, the framework developed will be implemented as a web-
based system that would be able to perform risk analysis of a supply chain. The system
will be developed with in the context of a supply chain manager who may not be well
versed with the concepts of risk analysis but is adept in supply chain management. The
system will guide the entire risk analysis procedure and will be highly interactive. At the
end of the risk assessment procedure, the system will identify high-risk assets and alert
the supply chain manager to identify and implement safeguards.
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1.5 Thesis Format
Chapter 2 of this thesis explores the current state of the technology in risk analysis and
disruption management. Bayesian Networks, Fault trees and Fuzzy Logic have been
extensively studied to evaluate their usefulness for risk analysis of supply chains. A
methodology to assess and evaluate the threats in the supply chain is proposed in Chapter
3. Chapter 4 describes the implementation of this technique as a web application and
Chapter 5 presents a case study to evaluate the effectiveness of the system developed.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and summarizes the results obtained. This final chapter
also identifies the opportunities for future research.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Supply chain risk analysis is a relatively new field and the literature directly relating to
this subject is limited. However, risk analysis and supply chain management have been
researched extensively and significant accomplishments have been achieved. The
relevant literature supporting the subject, Supply Chain Risk Analysis, can be broadly
divided into four different areas: risk analysis, business continuity planning, logical
inference techniques and supply chain management. The literature review indicates that
even though supply chain vulnerability has always been the key issue of interest to the
industry, little has been done to understand the risks or to mitigate them. This is now
changing as the awareness, as well as concern for supply chain security has grown
exponentially.
2.2 Risk Analysis and Vulnerability Assessment Process
Risk analysis is the process of identifying threats and system vulnerabilities to analyze
consequences and estimate the expected loss. Risk management, on the other hand, is
defined as the process of reducing or averting risk associated with the system to an
acceptable level by implementing safeguards or by eliminating/avoiding the threat. Risk
analysis and management can be broadly classified into three categories — risk
assessment, consequence analysis and safeguard implementation [5].
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Development of risk analysis techniques primarily began with the fatal flash fire
accident while testing the launch test pad of the Apollo AS 240 mission, resulting in the
death of three astronauts. This event resulted in a total loss of $410 million and set back
the mission by 18 months [6]. Since then, NASA rigorously developed risk assessment
techniques to identify plausible causes for mission failure and potential consequences.
Even though, development of risk analysis techniques started with the aerospace industry,
much of the work has been done by the nuclear industry. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission released the Probabilistic Risk Assessment Guide in 1983 and The Fault
Tree handbook in 1981 that standardized the risk assessment procedure for the nuclear
industry [6]. Risk analysis and safety assessment is of special interest to the United States
Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD has to ensure the safety of persormel and
munitions. Also, it has to ensure that a safe working environment is provided to
employees. This resulted in the development of a series of guidelines for the program
managers to assess the risk associated with various processes and operations. These
guidelines are also known as Military Standard 882 series, with 882D being the most
recent guideline. Several risk assessment techniques have been developed as a result of
the extensive research work carried out in a variety of fields.
Some of the techniques are [7]:
• Cause-Consequence Analysis
• Event Tree Analysis
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
• Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
• Fault Tree Analysis
14
• Hazard and Operability Analysis
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis
• What-If / Checklist Analysis
• What-If Analysis
Selection of a technique depends on the application or system under consideration. It
may not be possible to judge a technique to be better than others, as each serve a specific
problem area. However, among all of the techniques, fault tree analysis is of special
interest as it starts relating threats to associated causal events and tries to model
interrelationships.
2.2.1 Terminology
Risk analysis techniques have been simultaneously in many fields. As a result, the
terminology has also been defined uniquely for each field. The following terminology is
the most common set of definitions used and will be used in this thesis [9].
Risk - Negative outcome of an activity due to an unwanted or unplanned activity.
Asset — Anything with monetary or operational value that needs to be protected.
Threat — An unwanted event with the potential to cause damage.
Vulnerability —A system weakness that could be exploited.
Expected loss — Anticipated negative impact to assets due to a threat.
Safeguard — Precautionary measures taken to mitigate the risks.
Consequence — The resulting effect of an action or change
Target - Combination of a threat asset pair
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2.2.2 Risk Analysis Process
The main objective of risk analysis and management is to reduce the overall loss from a
threat by implementing safeguards. Therefore, the cost of implementing and maintaining
safeguards should be less than the loss from a threat. In risk analysis, the cost of
implementing and maintaining a security measure and the indicated loss from the threat
are traded off to retain the cost benefits. However, in some cases the implementation of
the countermeasures may be guided by the significance of the asset under consideration
rather than costs alone.
Risk management is an ongoing process for maintaining an acceptable security
level. Once the level has been established, the system has to be updated on a day-to-day
basis and system has to be assessed regularly to check for new vulnerabilities and the
status of the security level. Hence, the risk management includes assigning and tracking
corrective actions and security levels.
Sandia National Laboratories developed a risk assessment technique that
estimates the risk factor using a risk matrix for a given asset/threat pair. The rows and
columns in the matrix represent consequences and frequency of occurrence values,
respectively and each cell in the matrix gives the corresponding risk value [10, 11].
Sandia's technique has been used by the National Department of Justice in
developing a methodology for vulnerability assessment of chemical facilities [10]. The
technique begins with the identification and evaluation of the facilities in an organization
to select high priority facilities. Activities in the high priority facilities are then identified
and evaluated to select high priority activities. The high priority activities are rigorously
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studied for possible threats, system vulnerabilities, existing safeguards and consequences
to estimate the risk factor using the risk matrix.
The utility of the risk matrix was evident in the recent symposium organized by
Multi-Lifecycle Engineering Research Center on Economic and Business Security held at
New Jersey Institute of Technology in July 2003. Howard Forbes, Director of the global
security group at Merck, presented a risk assessment technique used by Merck, which is
based on Sandia's technique [11]. With the risk assessment technique in place Merck is
able to identify some of the high-risk threats and safeguard operations. The risk matrix
developed by Sandia provides a good methodology to combine the frequency of
occurrence and consequences value to estimate the risk factor. This technique, however,
does not consider causal events and interrelationship between entities.
A recent report from the National Academy of Engineering clearly suggests that
most of the risk analysis techniques developed date back to NASA's space exploration or
Strategic Submarine programs. And, none of these techniques has the capability to fulfill
the requirements of a counter terrorism problem. In a counter terrorism problem, threats
are dynamic, and adversaries change tactics and targets based on the circumstances. Also,
the report advocates that a national strategy is required to protect critical infrastructure
elements from terrorist attacks. To protect critical infrastructure elements in various
industries like power and aerospace industries, constituting elements of the industry need
to be better understood and modeled to understand core vulnerabilities. The report has
also called for dedicated research in systems analysis, systems engineering, risk modeling
and assessment, and related model development to protect critical infrastructure and
better understand system vulnerabilities [12].
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Digital Sandbox group has developed a framework for assessing terrorism threats
to a military installation. This approach uses Bayesian inference engine to which data is
fed dynamically at run time to identify most plausible threats to an installation. The
application has been developed for a stand-alone military establishment and does not
account for complex interrelationships among installations. The software is discussed in
detail in the subsequent sections.
2.2.3 Vulnerability Assessment
Vulnerability assessment is an integral part of analyzing the risk. Vulnerability
assessment consists of three stages — threat assessment, target analysis, and prioritizing
mitigation recommendations and countermeasures [13]. The threat assessment stage aims
at identifying the potential threats, possible threat responses and consequences. Target
analysis determines the susceptibility of the asset to the threats based on certain factors
like the functionality, value, and importance to society. The last step in vulnerability
assessment is to rank the countermeasures based on a cost-benefit analysis. Until
recently, vulnerability assessment did not include terrorism risk. However, terrorism is
now being considered as an important potential to disruption. Hence, performing a
vulnerability assessment would identify more of such reasons.
2.2.3.1 Supply Chain Vulnerability. Supply chain vulnerability has also been
defined as an exposure to serious disturbance, arising from risks within the supply chain
as well as risks external to the supply chain [14]. Supply chain vulnerability arises due to
a variety of reasons.
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Some of the reasons are: [14-16]
1. Global nature of the chain leading to greater vulnerability to risks
2. Complexity of the chain or network of chains leading to lack of visibility and
coordination
3. Lean inventories making the system susceptible to minor disruptions
4. Dependence on a single supplier for a particular type of material or service
5. Non standardized products and practices
6. Fraud and abuse
7. Centralization of resources making the system more vulnerable
8. Outsourcing leading to high dependency on the supplier
9. Lack of visibility and control procedures leading to bullwhip effect
10. Volatility in demand leading to unreliable forecasts
11. Highly customized services or products thereby reducing the chances of outsourcing
in cases of emergency
12. Friction in supply chain leading to conflicting responsibilities and delegation power
13. Accidents, sabotage and natural disasters
14. Recognition or the attractiveness of assets to adversaries
2.2.3.2 Vulnerability Assessment Process.
	 According to B.D. Jenkins of
the Countermeasures, Inc, vulnerability assessment is carried out based on the following
axioms [9]:
1. The same population of threats exist for all systems and networks
2. The threats posed to a system are infinite in number and variety.
3. The only factor that can be estimated is the relative likelihood based on prior
occurrences, for example the likelihood of Colorado and California being hit by an
earthquake is higher than any other state in the US, but there is still a great deal of
uncertainty associated with the occurrences.
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4. The level of the vulnerability decreases as the safeguards increase. Implementation of
safeguards reduce risk in a system, the extent of reduction in risk depends on the
safeguard implemented.
5. All safeguards have inherent vulnerabilities.
6. An acceptable level of vulnerability can be achieved through the implementation of
countermeasures.
The vulnerability of the target is assessed based on the following factors [17]:
1. Level of visibility - awareness of target presence and visibility of the target
2. Level of criticality -usefulness to population, economy
3. Value of target -value associated with the asset
4. Access to target -ease with which the target can be entered
5. Level of hazard -based on presence and concentration of hazardous material
6. Population density -max no of individuals at given time
7. Potential for collateral damage - based on the number of people residing
Once the vulnerability of a system has been clearly identified, the next step is to
weigh various safeguards to mitigate risks. Some of the safeguards are standardization of
business processes, having multiple and reliable supplier base, decentralization of
resources, and cross training of employees. However, due to businesses constraints,
mainly the cost involved, the implementation of safeguards is restricted.
2.2.4 Risk Management Software
The vulnerability to a terrorist attack is of special interest to military and techniques like
DSHARP and THREATCON have been developed to evaluate the vulnerability
associated with the assets. These methods, however, are not very effective [18].
Department of Defense (DoD) in collaboration with Digital Sandbox developed a new
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tool Site Profiler to assess vulnerability of its establishments. However, the Site profiler
mainly deals with terrorist threats and other security issues associated with an asset. The
Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office is using the Site Profiler for the Joint
Vulnerability Assessment Tool Program, which will be used by all DoD organizations
and installations for anti-terrorism risk assessment and planning. Digital Sandbox, in
collaboration with Booz Allen Hamilton, a management-consulting firm, is using the Site
Profiler to manage the bio-terrorism threats by tracking chemical transactions. They are
also attempting to extend the application of Site Profiler to track passenger and cargo to
detect possible threats [18-19].
The Buddy System, which is developed by Counter-Measures Incorporation,
Hollywood also works on similar lines. The software is designed to evaluate vulnerability
of assets to threat not only from terrorism, but also those from other accidents like fire as
well. Raytheon Corporation is using the Buddy System in support of work related to
Presidential Decision Directive 63 for the National Communications System and the Joint
Program Office-Special Technologies Countermeasures. Major organizations like
Novartis, NASA and Dryden also use this software [20]. Both the Site Profiler and the
Buddy System can evaluate the threats to physical assets only. The industry on the other
hand is seeking a tool that will address the risk issues associated with physical and
operational security.
The Cobre Group has developed software, Helpmate, to develop knowledge bases
by identifying and characterizing operations in an organization. The developed
knowledge bases then aid in decision-making by providing the required process
information. But, it cannot neither predict the risk factor nor recommend safeguards for
21
risk mitigation. E Team, Inc. provides enterprise-level collaborative software to public
agencies and corporations for use in emergency response management, facility and event
security, disaster preparedness and recovery, and business continuity. E-Team provides a
common enterprise level platform which helps coordinate and communicate between
managers to help recover from a disaster. This software like Helpmate does not estimate
risk.
At the Los Alamos National Laboratory, researchers have developed simulation
tools to analyze certain key areas like transportation, epidemic breakouts and
infrastructure independencies. These simulations result in better understanding of key
factors influencing an activity. For example, the simulation of the traffic system enables a
better understanding of traffic bottlenecks and the traffic control can then be modified to
avoid this. The simulations perform different iterations for different countermeasures and
show the relative effect of their implementation. The system by itself does not seem to
suggest any countermeasure but the simulations represented graphically can be
interpreted better [21].
Palisade's @RISK is a financial risk analysis and Monte Carlo simulation add-nn
for Microsoft Excel. @RISK seamlessly integrates with the excel spreadsheet, adding
risk analysis to the existing models. @RISK uses probability distribution functions to
define uncertainties and calculates all possible outcomes in a situation and their
probabilities of occurrence. The output of @Risk is a probability distribution function.
@Risk requires probability distributions to define the behavior of uncertain parameters in
a system like demand fluctuations, seasonal variations. For rare events, the data required
to estimate the frequency of occurrence value or to assign an uncertainty distribution
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might not be available. Even though, @Risk is powerful tool for financial risk analysis,
the application of this tool is restricted for a supply chain.
Risk analysis software currently available in the market serve specific problem
areas and do not have the capability to assess risks in a supply chain. For example, Site
Profiler and @ Risk specifically address the issue of physical security and financial risk
respectively and cannot assess risks interchangeably. But, in a supply all aspects of risk
are important and they have to be assessed simultaneously. Apart from security and
financial risk, operational risk is also important in a supply chain. None of the risk
analysis software identify operations carried out in an organization to assess the risk of a
disruption. Also, the software do not identity causal events and model interrelationships.
Fault tree analysis is a well-known technique to model causal interrelationships. Fault
tree capability is required for a supply chain risk analysis tool as the interrelations among
the business need to be strongly accounted. The flowing two sections describe two of the
most relevant software to assess risks in a supply chain.
2.2.4 .1 Buddy System [9]. The Buddy System, a product from "Counter-
measures, incorporation", was launched way back in 1987. The software was developed
based on the experiences of US Department of Defense. Later on, the product was
extended to meet the requirements of industry. The product identifies and deals with the
risk associated in a system. The package uses quantitative and qualitative analysis
methodologies to assess the system vulnerability. The system after determining the
current level of vulnerability suggests countermeasures to mitigate the risks associated in
the system. The software works on the assumption that implementing countermeasures
will reduce vulnerability.
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The package uses visual fox-pro as a relational database and employs an
intelligent data collection module. The software presents the vulnerability of the system
graphically, to give a clear picture of the vulnerability associated with the system. At the
end of the analysis, the software generates a detailed report of system vulnerabilities and
the safeguards to be implemented to mitigate the risks. Finally, a report is generated using
Microsoft word.
The software collects data through survey questiormaires and has the capability to
store unlimited number of datasets and surveys. The software has three modules:
configuration module, survey module and analysis module. Configuration module
customizes the dataset. Data collection module collects the data required to do the
analysis. The data can be collected through web-based surveys, local area networks,
personal interviews etc. Analysis module evaluates the vulnerability of the system against
each of the threat considered in the system. After the evaluation of vulnerability of each
asset, the module recommends safeguards to mitigate the risk. The software can be linked
to MS project and uses Excel graphics to present the output. The software has been
extensively used in all kinds of industry, from health services to consulting firms.
The website, however does not mention the threats considered in the package.
Most probably the software can be applied only to stationary units, like buildings. The
software does not consider the interrelationship between different units in a supply chain,
which means that it does not analyze the vulnerability of a unit in relation to another.
The systematic procedure adopted by the Buddy System to assess risk is given below:
1. Comprehensive survey to generate or update a relational database
a. Survey preload feature completes 75% of survey by populating the database of
previous surveys
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b. User answers a series of questions and has a self configuring system to fit the
environment being surveyed
2. Survey is imported into analysis module by analyst
3. Establishes logical relationship between two or more surveys
4. Initial vulnerability levels are represented on the screen
5. Acceptable levels of vulnerability are set based on data sensitivity or other factors
established by survey
6. Determines level of vulnerability of the system and displays graphically in either
average or worst case scenario
7. Finds out threat activity
8. Calculates risk and loss probability based on level of vulnerability
9. Recommends safeguards
10. Generates formal Project level risk analysis report
The utility of buddy system in analyzing supply chain risks is very limited. As, the
software does not neither consider interrelationships among business units nor supply
chain questions while analyzing risks. Moreover, since the technique derives most of the
information from a questiormaire, it may not be the most appropriate approach to analyze
risks in a supply chain.
2.2.4.2 Site Profiler [18].
	 The Site profiler is developed based on a generic
application development environment that dynamically feds Bayesian inference engine
with data at the run time. This model combines evidence from analytic models,
simulations, historical data and user judgments to estimate the risk factor.
The Joint Vulnerability Assessment Tool program uses the Site profiler for anti-
terrorism risk assessment and planning. Site profiler uses an architecture that can feed
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network nodes with data from disparate sources. The disparate sources include the
plarmer's own subjective and objective assessments, historical database information,
analytical model results and simulation results that are integrated into various nodes on
the Bayesian Network. The fragments in the risk influence Bayesian Network are
designed to match the user's knowledge of domain concept, ensuring a scalable modular
and maintainable model.
The specific aims for designing the model are listed as follows
• Modeling the capabilities and intent of terrorist organizations
• Determine the plausibility of various types of weapon systems and tactics that could
be employed against the installation
• Assess the target value of the installation and its assets in the eyes of the terrorists
• Calculate the susceptibility of each of those assets to attack by a given weapon system
• Model the consequences of an attack in lives, property damage and mission effect,
should it occur
The model requires a characterization of assets of an installation and threats to be
considered as an input to generate the Risk influence Network (ERIN) for each asset/threat
pair. Relational information is also required for the generation of the threat/asset pairs
and the manual entry of the relational aspects of this being infeasible, the relational
aspects are calculated using Bayesian Networks based on complete characterization of
the assets and threats. The Site Profiler uses seven objects to create the ERIN [19] —
1. Installation
2. Asset
3. Threat
4. Weapon system
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5. Terrorist organization
6. Target
7. Attack
The system constructs a RIN for each threat/asset pair and runs software simulation
and database queries, applies evidence and computes risks, which are presented back to
the user. The RIN contains the information regarding the installation, the asset, the threat,
the asset threat target pairing and the attack event. Nodes in the Bayesian network define
the risk elements, which in turn combine to contribute towards the definition of risk
associated with a target — likelihood of event, susceptibility of an asset to the event,
consequences of the event and the risk of the event.
The system model is constructed in a 3D environment. User interface screens are
created dynamically by inspecting the asset and entering the user set attributes. The
building is algorithmically constructed by reading its height material type etc. Blast
models then calculate the risk and structural response.
The assessments allow the prioritization and the assessment of an installation's
vulnerabilities. To model the ERIN (Risk Influence Network), two factors —
recognizability and accessibility are defined. Recognizability is queried from the user, but
accessibility is obtained from various factors such as weapon delivery systems, terrain,
road networks, physical security and many other factors. Just like the previous
application, threat vectors are used to define accessibility for each threat/asset pair.
Risk management requires the testing of safeguards for effectiveness and
efficiency. Site Profiler uses AT (Anti-terrorism) functions are used for this purpose. AT
functions are composed of safeguards, procedures, and organizations. These AT
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functions are applied to risks by characterizing procedures and safeguard effectiveness
against potential attacks. The effectiveness model considers a set of parameters for each
AT function — delay, denial, deterrence, detection, mitigation, interdiction, response and
cost. The model has the ability to create AT functions that addresses the risk that are
critical and select the best AT function based on their effectiveness, availability and cost
[19].
The core components of the software architecture are listed below:
• User interface that can customize itself to the particulars of each installation
• Database of historical and current data regarding terrorists and weapons
• Modeling environment to describe the assets, installation and infrastructure under
consideration
• Simulation engine to interpret models and simulate threats against it
• Plug-in interface to incorporate external models
• Automatic document generator to prepare DoD standardized reports
All the consequence models of the software are implemented as plug-ins. This allows
the model to be to be registered with the system as they are developed, ensuring
availability of current and highest quality data without requiring a code change. Every
piece of data in the ERIN is stored as a node, which is then used to calculate Belief through
probabilistic inference. This belief is interpreted as the probability of a certain event
occurring, based on all the data.
The working methodology of Site profiler can be summarized as below:
• Data collection — data from disparate sources — users, historical data, analytical
models and simulation
• Prompts the user to describe the features of an asset
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• Prompts the user to select possible modes of attacks
• Identifies the elements that affect risk and evaluating their interaction
• Constructs Bayesian objects and risk influence network
• Computation engine to solves the network and computes the risk associated with each
threat/asset pair using Bayesian network solution module
• Computes the consequences of a threat using plug-ins like blast analysis
• Checks for credibility of the model and if the evidence is not credible, then the
program goes back to data collection module and prompts the user to enter data or to
take a decision.
• Generates the report
Site Profiler is the most advanced risk analysis software to date. However, the
software has been developed for military sites. The threats against a military facility and
supply chain entities are totally different. Site Profiler, even though brings in strong
engineering and system analysis concepts, does not have the capability to analyze risks
considering independencies.
2.5 Business Continuity Management
Recent events exposed the vulnerability of supply chains and demonstrated that the
business continuity and disaster recovery plans in place were inadequate. Business
continuity management, also known as business continuity plarming and contingency
planning, was never given due importance due to economic reasons and firms belief that
government is fully responsible for disaster response and recovery.
Business continuity management has become vital to the survival of a business, as
firms operate with JIT production and maintain lean inventories. Furthermore,
globalization of supply chains has made the chain susceptible to cross border disruptions.
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As the chains are becoming increasingly complex and interdependent, any minor
disruption in any part of the chain can have crippling effect along the entire supply chain.
Moreover, with the advancement in technology, the lead-time has been reduced
significantly. Due to the reduced lead-time, the time available to recover from the
disruption without affecting business is significantly less than before [22].
Based on the survey conducted by the Council of Logistics Management, the following
figures were presented [23-24]:
• 58% of the organizations were affected by the events of September 11 th
• 12 % were severely affected.
• Firms with large inventory turnovers were more affected.
• Only about 61% of US firms have disaster recovery plans.
• Most of the plans cover data centers and the estimate is that only 12% cover total
organization recovery.
• Specific plans to sustain supply chain operations are given limited coverage in most
business continuity plans.
• Approximately 72% of executives do not have crisis management or equivalent
teams; even fewer have supply chain representation.
• Crisis response training is only active in approximately 27% of firms.
• Approximately 57% of managers are not satisfied with their company's crisis
response capabilities.
• Estimates indicate that 43% of businesses that suffer a major fire (or other major
damage) never reopen for business after the event.
Apart from the reasons listed above, having a good business continuity plan in place
would improve confidence among business partners and improve the firm's credibility in
the market. To continue business and flourish in an uncertain and global environment, it
is necessary to have an effective and tested business continuity management plan in
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place. Business continuity management anticipates a disaster and recommends mitigation
plan to recover from the disaster while trying to reduce recovery time and loss. This plan
is sketched out based on what-if scenarios. Historically, firms were dependent on the
insurance to safeguard their interests against unwarranted incidents. Using historical data,
assessments were made regarding the occurrence of an incident. This data is used to
evaluate the insurance premium. This process safeguarded the firm against financial and
capital loss. However, this did not cover intangibles losses, including lost customer base
or lost reputation.
Moreover, disaster recovery and emergency plarming was initiated after the
occurrence of an unwanted event. Often, managers avoided processes/practices that
added risk to their business. Procuring a component, for example, from an offshore
supplier may be more risky than procuring it from a local supplier as the possibility of a
disruption or delay in shipment arrival is extremely high. If the manager decides against
the offshore supplier without analyzing the full implications then he is jeopardizing
significant amount of business.
As the markets and business environment has changed and markets have become
uncertain, policies which worked fine in the past no longer hold. The events of September
11 resulted in the removal of all forms of terrorist acts from the regular insurance
coverage and a separate terrorism insurance coverage has to be bought at an exorbitant
price [25]. Also, in the event of a disaster, the firm has to stand up to the requirements
and expectations of different groups.
They are
• Customers and shareholder's expect the management to be fully operational.
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• Employees expect their livelihoods to be protected
• Suppliers expect revenues to continue.
• Law enforcement bodies expect the firm to adhere to the law irrespective of the
consequences
• Insurance companies expect due care to be exercised.
With effectiveness being the most crucial factor in implementing a recovery plan
it may not always be possible to develop an optimal recovery plan with so many
constrains after the disaster occurs. Though the firms have effective disaster recovery
plans if something goes wrong within their firm like a fire in the factory, but they don't
have a plan to recover from an event that happens in their supply chain. With the recent
extraordinary events- i.e. events with low probability and high consequences, it is
imperative that firms should have an effective business continuity plan in place. Business
continuity plarming should be driven by both the probability of occurrence and the
consequences of an event. Usually risk mitigation plans consider events with high
occurrence and events with low probability were left out. But with threats emerging up
which have a low probability and high consequences both factors have to considered to
design an effective business continuity plan.
Business continuity management can be divided into two distinct areas. They are
disaster recovery and emergency plarming. A disaster is defined as an unexpected
occurrence causing a widespread and long-term damage to the firm's business. An
emergency is defined as a situation, which develops in a short period of time and calls for
immediate action. Most the time, business continuity and disaster recovery plans are
inclined towards information security and data retrieval. This is due to the fact any loss in
data may be fatal to the company.
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Business Continuity and Supply Chain Management firms conducted a survey to
find the most significant threats perceived by the industry. Loss in IT capital tops the list,
followed by loss in skill and damage in corporate image. The survey indicates that even
though, loss in it capacity in the most significant risk but at the same the industry is
facing risks from other threats too, which cannot be neglected [26].
Business continuity management is based on business impact analysis. Business
impact analysis is a systematic approach to assess the business damage due to a threat
[27]. Plarmers identify various possible worst-case scenarios and conduct impact analysis.
Business impact analysis is analogues to risk analysis. While business impact analysis is
based on the worst-case scenario, risk analysis is based on the various threats identified
against the system. In business impact analysis, critical assets and processes are identified
and evaluated for possible responses due of a threat. Based on the impact analysis, risk
mitigation and recover plans are designed. Nicole Ross argues that the worst-case
scenario should be acceptable for the firms business. For example, Virtual Corporation, a
New Jersey based business continuity plarming firm, while analyzing the business
continuity plans of a large brokerage firm in New York assumed that its worst-case
scenario would single building in Wall Street. In such an event they planned to shift their
business temporarily to the other building in Wall Street [28]. In wake of the terrorist
attacks, the whole of lower Manhattan was closed, disrupting their business and rendering
their plan to be useless. However, plarming for extraordinary incidents may not be
possible for all firms especially mid-sized and small firms. McCarthy argues that, if a
firm plans and puts the Enterprise Risk Management model in place, a framework can be
created to handle any scenario [27, 29]. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
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the Treadway defines, Enterprise risk management as a process, effected by an entity's
board of directors, management and other persormel, applied in strategy setting and
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and
manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of entity objectives [30].
A business continuity plan should be incorporated into the firms business like the
way in which total quality management has been incorporated. Firms strive to provide
high quality products and services, and quality improvement and management is an
important corporate goal. Quality management is a basic necessity rather than a
requirement. Likewise, business continuity management should also become a part of
corporate policy and should not be performed as requirement. Management involvement
and their interest to implement a business continuity plan are key factors that decide the
success of a plan. Also, the success of a plan depends on the effectiveness with which it
can be implemented and its ability to recover from a disaster. Effective implementation
requires exercise of the plan, requiring the involvement of all employees in the firm.
The employees in the firm should be aware of the plan and know their part of duty and
responsibility. Business continuity plarming is a continuum, where the plan is revised
periodically. In the past, business continuity plans were event driven and were evaluated
and revised after the occurrence of an incident. However, with the emergence of new
threats it has been realized to evaluate the plan periodically irrespective of the occurrence
of the incidents. A business continuity plan varies from industry to industry depending
on its type and infrastructure. A generic continuity plan can be divided to five basic steps.
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They are business impact and risk analysis, strategy development, response scenarios,
awareness and training, and exercise and maintenance.
John Sharp, former Chief Executive Officer of The Business Continuity Institute,
proposed a model for business continuity plarming or business continuity management,
which is based on ten certification standards of the Business Continuity institute [261
The model performs a business impact analysis, through which the most vulnerable areas
are identified. In this method, loss in customer base or confidence is the highest weighed
risk. First, the critical vulnerabilities and threats in the firm are identified and then a risk
analysis is done to quantify the risk. The result of the risk analysis is used to prioritize the
business functions. Once the key risks are identified, mitigation strategies are
recommended which can successfully recover the business from a disaster. The drafted
plan is then disseminated among the employees.
The next stage is to exercise and test the plan. The plan is rigorously practiced and
tested so that the firm and its employees are ready for any eventuality. With proper
training chaos can be avoided, thereby enabling the firm to maintain customer and
shareholder's confidence, which are of utmost importance. Moreover, employees are the
key assets to any firm; protecting employees and retaining their emotional stability are
important for a quick recovery from the disaster. Proper training and exercise of the plan
could reduce workforce loss and help the firm to continue business in an uncertain
environment.
Often, business continuity planning is done at organizational level and does not
include scenarios wherein business would be affected due to problems with partnering
firms. For example, business continuity plarming does consider that data loss is a major
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threat. But, continuity plarming does consider the scenario where the sole source supplier
is out of business or decides not to supply. Business continuity plarming like supply chain
management should be a collaborative effort by all firms in a supply chain. Also, it may
not be possible for a firm to design continuity plans for a partnering firm. Cooperation
and information sharing among the supply partners is a critical issue, which will decide
the implementation of the business continuity plan along the supply chain.
Until recently, there were no standards or metrics to measure the effectiveness of
a continuity plan. But, it is extremely important to measure the effectiveness of a business
continuity plan and compare it the plans of competing organizations to have an upper
hand in the market. Also, a methodology to measure the effectiveness of a plan will
enable firm's to judge their responsiveness to an emergency.
In January 2002, Scott Ream, President of Virtual Corporation, introduced the
concept of Business Continuity Maturity Model [31]. The model, based on certain
parameters like management leadership and business continuity awareness, evaluates the
effectiveness of a business continuity plan and assigns an efficiency level.
For each parameter, a numeric value is assigned to determine the overall
effectiveness of the plan [32]. The model estimates the effectiveness of a business
continuity plarming at organizational level of the enterprise. The model is still in the
development being developed in collaboration with the industry. At this stage, the model
does not evidently address supply chain security issues. Hopefully, the model on
completion will have the capability to address business continuity issues from supply
chain perspective.
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Business continuity management has been concerned with post-disaster recovery.
The evolving philosophy, however, is to avoid or avert the disruptive event to eliminate
or minimize consequences. Studying the causal events contributing to the disruptive
event is necessary to avoid the threat, in addition to studying the possible consequences
of the threat. Business continuity management should not be remediation effort but
should try to eliminate the risk source.
2.4 Logical Inference Techniques to Solve Uncertainty Problems
To analyze any risk environment, it is vital to know the paths of threat propagation and
the probability associated with each. Damage can be caused by various events and often
an event of disruption triggers a set of events as in a chain reaction. Therefore, a complete
causal tree structure and an inference engine are required to determine the most probable
path and the relative probabilities of occurrence for any chain of events. Bayesian
networks and fuzzy logic are most popular and frequently used inference tools.
2.4.1 Bayesian Networks
These are also called Belief Networks or Probabilistic Inference Networks. The idea of
Bayesian networks was initially developed by Pearl in 1988. Bayesian networks in the
recent years have evolved as an excellent and powerful tool to handle uncertainty. The
concept has become popular in the recent times due to tremendous increase in
computational power and due to development of heuristics search techniques to find
events with the highest probability. Bayesian networks are based on the Baye's theorem,
which was proposed by Thomas Baye. The theorem gives a methodology to combine
subjective beliefs and the evidence available. Initially Bayesian theorem did not find
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much application, as it is difficult to assign the full probability distribution manually.
With the advances in computational power, network generation and data feeding can be
done automatically. This gave a new dimension to development and understanding of
Bayesian networks [33-34].
Initially a brute force algorithm was used to solve an inference problem. As this
technique was not adequate, rule-based methods were developed in the late 70's and 80's.
This method was based on if-then propositions but the method took a long time to put the
information together as the system needs all the questions to be answered clearly to give
correct results.
To increase the efficiency of the systems, neural networks were developed. These
networks were able to handle a huge amount of data and figure out patterns in the data.
Though neural nets seemed promising they had a shortcoming, the system was not
capable of handling uncertain information. Neural networks infer based on the previous
experiences and the set of possible events and their corresponding outcomes has to be
assigned. With neural networks it is not possible to train a system, as enough historical
data would not be available to make a decision. This shortcoming leads to the search for a
tool, which could decide when enough data is not available. Due to the shortcoming in AI
techniques, firms in this field were almost on the verge of bankruptcy.
In the late 80's, AI researchers discovered that Bayesian networks could be used
to handle uncertain information. Horvitz and his two colleagues in Microsoft started
developing a network, which could diagnose the condition of patients without turning to
surgery. According to Horvitz, this method was effective and efficient as it was capable
of combining historical data and imprecise subjective beliefs of the experts in the field.
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Horvitz with his two colleagues helped Microsoft develop and apply Bayesian
networks to real world cases. With their help, Microsoft developed the system the help
system in word. The help system pops up the help menu based on the movement of
mouse. If the movement of the mouse is wayward, then network infers that the user is
looking for something and based on the mouse movement the network pops up the help
menu with possible alternatives, which the user might be looking for.
Scott Musman, developed a network which could identify enemy missiles and
aircrafts, and recommend the best weapons to counteract the enemy. General electric
developed a technique, which can locate emerging engine problems based on the
information from sensors and from the expert opinion, which is encoded into the
database.
Microsoft is working on techniques that will enable the Bayesian networks to
"learn" or update themselves automatically based on new knowledge, a task that is
currently cumbersome. Microsoft is unquestionably the most aggressive firm in
exploiting the new approach. The company offers a free Web service that helps
customers diagnose printing problems with their computers and recommends the quickest
way to resolve them. Another Web service helps parents diagnose their children's health
problems.
Bayesian Networks or Bayesian Nets work on the principle of Bayes' Theorem.
Bayes' Theorem states that:
The above equation gives the probability that the "hypothesis is true given
evidence E is equal to the ratio of the probability that E will be true given times the a
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priori evidence on the probability of and the sum of the probability of E over the set of
all hypotheses times the probability of these hypotheses" [35]. The throerm requires that
the set of all hypotheses must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
lntailly, Bayes' Rule was not used in Artificial lntellgence because it requires full
joint probability distribution and the networks are extremely complex to solve. But in
recent years, due to exponentail increse in computational power, Bayesian techniques
have been of tremendous interest because of its capability of handling uncertain
information.
Heckerman, a researcher at Microsoft, defines a Bayesian network as an
armotated directed acyclic graph that encodes probabilistic relationships amoung
distictions of interest in an uncertain reasoning problem. According to him, the
representation rigourousy models these interrelationships and is intuitive [36]. Also,
Bayesian updating provides a means of propagating beliefs along the network. Bayesian
networks are a rich and powerful way of building probabilistic models. Bayesian
networks are represented as a graph where the links indicate dependencies that exist
between nodes. The nodes represent probabilities about events or events themselves and
the Conditional probabilities quantify the strength of dependencies.
According to Peter Haddawy, " The success of Bayesian networks lies largely in
the fact that the formalism introduces structure into probabilistic modeling and cleanly
separates the qualitative structure of a model from the quantitative aspect." [37].
Bayesain Networks have been successfully applied in a variety of subjects like medical
diagnosis, intelligent user interfaces , and threat assessment of a site.
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2.4.1.1 Advantages of Bayesian Netvvorks[38-44] :
1. Forward and backward reasoning
2. Conditional interdependance allows efficient updating and the probabilities can be
changed in wake of new evidence
3. Matches the real world where probability of one event is Conditional on the
probability of previous one
4. Data can be dynamicaly combined with the network at the run time thereby enabling
continious monitoring
5. Elaborate research has been Conducted in this field to tap the full potential of
Bayesian networks
6. Can be used on real large scale problems
7. Can combine diverse data including subjective beliefs and empirical data
2.4.1.2 Disadvantages of Bayesian Netvvorks[43,45,38] :
1. The events represented by each node has to be mutually exhaustive
2. The number of conditional probabilities varies exponentially over the number of
nodes
3. Bayesian Networks do not account for the vagueness in a system
4. Exclude the possibility of an event that is neither completely true nor completely false
5. Updating new information is difficult and time consuming
6. Exceptions like "none of the above" carmot be represented
2.4.2 Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is a superset of conventional Boolean logic with capability to account for
imprecise information. Fuzzy logic permits usage of vague information, knowledge and
concepts in an exact mathematical marmer. Words and phrases such as fast, slow, and
very fast are used to describe continuous, overlapping states. This enables qualitative and
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imprecise reasoning statements to be incorporated within rule-bases to develop simple,
more intuitive and better-behaved models.
Fuzzy logic is based on the principle that every crisp value belongs to all relevant
Fuzzy sets to various extents, called the degrees of membership. The membership values
range from 0 to 1. This contrasts with conventional Boolean logic, where information can
either be true or false. This graduation from zero to one smoothes out the transition sets.
Unlike Boolean logic where sets are mutually exclusive, Fuzzy logic allows crisp values
to belong to more than one Fuzzy set. This means that whereas in a crisp system, only
one rule might be fired and used, in a Fuzzy system all rules are used, with each having
some influence on the resulting output. This is more of a consensus approach to expert
systems.
A system that runs on Fuzzy control incorporates Fuzzy variables like speed,
temperature and Fuzzy qualifiers like hot, cold, slow, fast. Applying a qualifier to a
Fuzzy variable generates a Fuzzy set. For each Fuzzy set there is a membership function
relating crisp to Fuzzy values, and which is defined in terms of its shape and location.
Fuzzy logic also incorporates the function of Fuzzy modifiers like very, extremely and
not very, often referred to linguistic hedges. These affect the membership function by
intensifying or spreading its shape. Fuzzy rules define relationships between different
Fuzzy sets as if-then rules. These rules can be grouped into matrices, commonly known
as Fuzzy associative memory.
ln Fuzzy reasoning over sets, there are standard operations such as union and
intersection. These operations can be defined in terms of simple mathematical operations
such as maximum, minimum, and addition. The final stage of a Fuzzy evaluation is the
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conversion back from Fuzzy membership values to crisp values for the output variables
that is referred to as defuzzification. The two standard defuzzifiers are the centroid
method, which is based on the center of gravity, and the peak method, which is based on
the highest Fuzzy value.
Pure Fuzzy logic has extremely limited applications and the only popularized application
is the Sony Palmtop. The main use of Fuzzy logic is as an underlying logic system for
Fuzzy expert systems. Fuzzy expert system is a collection of membership functions and
rules that are used to reason about data. Once the rules and membership functions are
defined, the input variables have to compute values for output variables. This process is
called the inference process, which is in turn a combination of four sub-processes —
fuzzification, inference, composition and defuzzification [46].
The fuzzification sub process, the membership functions are applied to their
actual values to determine the degree of truth for each rule premise. In the inference sub
process, these truth-values are computed and applied to the conclusion part of each rule.
ln the composition sub process, all the Fuzzy subsets to output variables are combined to
form a single Fuzzy subset for each output variable. The subsets are then converted to
values, which are further converted to a single number, or a crisp value by the
defuzzification process [46].
2.4.2.1 Applications of Fuzzy Logic based systems
1. Robots and other automated control mechanisms
2. Camera aiming for live telecast (Omron)
3. Prediction Systems for early recognition of earth quakes
4. Flight aid for helicopters
43
5. Temperature control
6. Traffic Control
2.4.2.2 Advantages of Fuzzy Systems
1. Accounts for the ambiguity or uncertainty in describing an event [38]
2. Represents better interpolation between topologically related states for variables [38]
3. Represents uncertainty of categorization [38]
4. Provides rules for the truth value of complex statements
5. Easy system construction and implementation [47]
6. Allows formalization of vague data [48]
The other advantages of Fuzzy logic expert systems compared to non-Fuzzy expert
systems are that they typically require fewer rules, need fewer variables, use a linguistic
rather than a numerical description, and can relate output to input for any device without
needing to understand the device's inner workings.
2.4.2.3 Disadvantages of Fuzzy Systems
1. There is no completeness in inference formalism i.e. there is no optimal method for
drawing an inference. The inference can be drawn from a combination of different
rules, but no specific combination of rules can be clearly identified as giving an
optimal solution for a given problem [38].
2. Basic functions like min and max, which are the core components in Fuzzy logic are
not supported by evidence, but are assumptions [38].
3. Backward reasoning is not possible
4. Membership values do not change in the wake of new evidence [49].
To overcome the disadvantages of the Bayesian and Fuzzy based systems, hybrid
networks are now being studied. The hybrid networks can be Hybrid Probabilistic
Models or Hybrid Fuzzy logic systems. These try to incorporate the advantages of both
systems and minimize their disadvantages.
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2.4.3 Fuzzy Belief Networks
Hybrid Fuzzy Bayesian network or Fuzzy Belief Network is a blend of Bayesian network
and Fuzzy logic techniques. Heping Pan and Daniel McMichael proposed a methodology
that takes advantage from both of the popular concepts to overcome the disadvantages
associated with each methodology [38]. This method incorporates a non-Bayesian
probability index (degree of truth rather than degree of belief) and provides a structure to
propagate this index along the network. This method is also capable of combining
evidence to determine the belief in a node. This method adopts three basic steps while
making an inference — fuzzification, inference and defuzzification. In the first step, crisp
or continuous variables are converted into Fuzzy variables using a fuzzifier function. This
step maps each of the crisp variables to a set of discrete Fuzzy states.
In the second step, the variables are plugged into a Bayesian network to form a Fuzzy
causal network. Each node in the network represents a Fuzzy variable and the links
represent the interrelationships among the variables. To deduct an inference from the
network, traditional Bayesian algorithms are used to solve the network. If required the
discrete Fuzzy variables can be converted back into crisp variables using defuzzification
module.
Neural networks could be integrated with Fuzzy expert systems to tune the shapes of
Fuzzy membership functions of the different design variables, which will improve the
reasoning and confidence performance of the entire system.
2.4.3.1 Applications
• Medical diagnostic systems
• Modeling of brain
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• Data mining
• Speech recognition
• lmage modelling
• Space exploration
• Intel processor fault diagnosis
2.4.3.2 Advantages
1. The number of conditional probabilities to be assigned reduces drastically
2. Account for uncertainty as well as vagueness in describing as event
3. Forward as well as backard reasoning [38]
4. Computationally simple [38]
5. Fewer constraints
6. Linear time complexity [38]
Fuzzy Belief Networks certainly look promising for solving uncertainty related models,
but detailed study is yet to be done to analyze the possible drawbacks.
2.4.4 Hybrid Bayesian Networks
Hybrid Bayesian Networks provide a mode of improvement over Bayesian Networks. In
the traditional Bayesian Networks, the nodes can either be discrete or continuous
variables, but carmot incorporate both in the same network. However, real world
scenarios can be represented only by a combination of continuous as well as discrete
variables. Hybrid Bayesians incorporate this feature enabling a better representation of
the real world.
The most popular class of hybrid models are known as the Conditional Linear
Gaussians (CLGs). This class of hybrid Networks does not allow non-linear relations
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between continuous variables and does not allow discrete nodes to have continuous
parents. The main advantage of this type of network is the mathematical convenience.
Given any assignment of the discrete variables, the distribution over continuous variables
is a multivariate gaussian. Thus, the joint probability distribution is a mixture of
gaussians, which can be handled using analytical tools.
However, CLGs have linearity restrictions and approximate inference in CLGs is
NP hard. However, there are heuristics that have been developed for solving these classes
of networks. The state of the art algorithm for exact inference in CLGs is Lauritzen's
algorithm, which is based on the clique tree algorithm, originally developed to solve
discrete Bayesian networks. Nevertheless, in many cases, Lauritzen's algorithm is
intractable even for simple network structures. Moreover, the CLGs suffer the drawback
of the inability to incorporate continuous parents for discrete nodes, which is more or less
the case in the real world. Uri Lerner, a PhD student at Stanford University researchers
has developed an algorithm for augmented CLGs, which can incorporate discrete nodes
as the children of continuous parents [50]. Another class of Hybrid Bayesian Networks is
the Dynamic Hybrid Bayesian Networks (DBNs), which can efficiently model stochastic
processes. CLGs with linearity restrictions can be solved using Switching Linear
Dynamic Systems [51].
2.4.5 Bayesian Network Vs. Fuzzy Systems
All the techniques discussed above are tools to handle uncertainty and derive a
relationship between the events that can lead to uncertainty. Solving the Bayesian
network has been proved to be NP hard. Probabilistic approaches make an inference
based on a population of events (e.g. probability of a student getting an "A" grade given
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the number the number of students and no of students getting an "A" grade), while fuzzy
systems pertain to a particular event in consideration (the possibility of a student getting
an "A" grade, based on his performance). Fuzzy systems are more useful are practical
when conditional probabilities are not available. The Fuzzy expert system generates an
inference by different combinations of Fuzzy rules. There is no method to find out the
optimal combination of rules, which can give the best possible outcome. Hence, all the
techniques are approximate reasoning techniques and have their relative advantages and
disadvantages.
Fuzzy set theory and Fuzzy logic deal with imprecision inherent in human
thinking, while probability theory is concerned with the uncertainty involved in decision-
making [43]. The Bayesian theory deals with only two states for a variable — true or
false. The intermediate cases are not considered. The Fuzzy systems account for the
intermediate cases as well. Bayesian systems generate conditional probability tables and
the number of conditional inter-relationships is exponentially related to the number of
discrete variables. The use of Fuzzy systems can substantially reduce the size of this data
set and may improve the stability and smoothness of system performance [43]. Fuzzy sets
use "linguistic variables" like tall, medium and low instead of numerical variables. This
can be of advantage while trying to make inferences from the network. Also, adjectives
and adverbs like more than and less than are used to modify the membership curves
mathematically.
While Fuzzy systems account for both uncertainty and vagueness, Bayesian
networks account only for uncertainty. But when Fuzzy variables are involved in
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complicated Fuzzy relations including functions and implications, things begin to become
indeterministic. ln contrast, the Baye's theory enables forward and backward inference.
Fuzzy systems are better when the whole network can be represented in terms on
qualitative expressions and quantitative representations are absent in the network. But, if
the result has to be represented in terms of probabilities or confidence intervals then
probabilistic approaches are more convenient to use. While designing a stand-alone
system, a system that has to work on its own without inputs from the user or expert, fuzzy
approach has an advantage over probabilistic approach [52].
According to Kathryn Laskey, in most cases Bayesian systems can out-perform
Fuzzy systems when computational tractability, accuracy and usability are taken into
consideration. But there may be cases when Fuzzy systems can be on the top. When one
of her students made an empirical analysis to compare the two methods for a ship
autopilot, the Fuzzy rules did better than the Bayesian system. Kathryn says " I am
hypothesizing that the utility, averaged across exchangeable problem instances, of the
Fuzzy system output is higher than the utility, averaged across exchangeable problem
instances, of the Bayesian system output, if that is the case, then go with Fuzzy system."
According to Keith M. Reynolds, "Bayesian belief networks may be preferable to
Fuzzy logic networks when conditional probabilities of outcomes are known. However,
Bayesian belief networks, like production rule systems, are difficult to apply to large,
general problems because the number of conditional probabilities that must be specified
can quickly become extremely large as the conceptual scope of a problem increases. ln
such situations, model design not only becomes difficult to manage but many
probabilities will not be well characterized and will therefore need to be supplied by
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expert judgment, thus negating much of the value to be gained by a more statistically
based approach to knowledge representation. [53]. According to Meyer, fuzzy logic is an
appropriate tool when the way in which experts identify measure or forecast the
phenomena is likely to change over time and fuzzy systems add more flexibility and
robustness to the system.
To overcome the disadvantages of the Bayesian and Fuzzy based systems, hybrid
networks are now being studied. The hybrid networks can be Hybrid Probabilistic
Models or Hybrid Fuzzy logic systems. These try to incorporate the advantages of both
systems and minimize their disadvantages.
2.5 Synopsis
Recent events had a very adverse impact on the US economy. Many industries
could not sustain themselves as the economy crumpled and had to declare bankruptcy.
The unexpected disruptions in the supply chain leading to heavy financial losses aroused
a necessity to address the issue of vulnerability assessment and risk mitigation. American
economy is not in a position to endure another serious disruption and supply chains
clearly need to be secured.
The current state of the technology is not capable of addressing the issue of
supply chain risk analysis, as a supply chain is a highly interdependent system. Advances
in system modeling and analysis are required to model infrastructure elements for
studying and analyzing core system vulnerabilities. Also, supply chains need to be further
studied to understand the complex interrelationships that drive supply chain performance.
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Currently, none of the logical inference techniques can be judged as the most
appropriate technique for risk analysis of supply chains. Each technique has specific
advantages and disadvantages. lt may not be possible to select a technique unless the
critical parameters influencing supply chain parameters are identified and studied.
Also, none of the software available in the market addresses the issue of supply
chain risk analysis and management. Companies like the E-Team and Strohl Systems
serve the area of disaster recovery and management. Moreover, business continuity
plarming has not yet included pre-disaster plarming to avoid the risk. Software systems
like the Site Profiler and the Buddy System deal with physical asset security, but does
neither address inter-relationships between assets nor the operational risks within the
supply chain. Researchers at the Los Alamos National Laboratories have developed
simulation tools to analyze certain specific area, but the system does not incorporate more
than one activity at a time nor the inter relationships between activities. Moreover, these
simulations need exceptional computational power and significant resources that the
commercial industry carmot afford. There are many more software's that perform a
financial risk assessment like the Palisade groups @Risk, but all of them are very specific
in their application.
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1 Risk Analysis
Risk analysis and management is becoming an increasingly popular technique to
support decision making under uncertainty. This procedure identifies and estimates the
expected damage due to uncertainties in a system and recommends safeguards to mitigate
or avert risk. Risk is defined as a negative outcome of an activity due to an unwanted or
unplarmed activity [54]. Risk analysis estimates the risk factor based on two parameters:
the frequency of occurrence and severity of consequences. Frequency of occurrence is the
likelihood of the threat occurring. And, severity of consequences is the loss or disutility
due to the adverse outcome. Risk is calculated in many ways. ln this thesis, risk will be
calculated as the product of frequency of occurrence and severity of consequences.
Risk = Frequency of Occurrence * Severity of Consequences
The above equation is the most standard expression used to calculate the risk
factor. Risk analysis tries to capture and quantify the uncertainties in a system. lt may
not be possible to determine when exactly an event will occur but the probability with
which it occurs can be estimated. For example, it may not be possible to predict when a
machine will fail but its failure rate can be estimated.
Even though risk in a system is calculated based on two parameters, it depends on
four distinct different parameters. They are frequency of occurrence, severity of
consequences, system vulnerabilities and the effectiveness of the safeguards. Figure 3.1
gives a pictorial representation of the factors contributing to risk.
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Figure 3.1 Factors Contributing to Risk.
The frequency of occurrence and severity of consequences depend on the system
vulnerabilities and safeguards in place. Vulnerabilities relate to threat occurrence and
consequences, while safeguards counteract threat occurrence and consequences. All of
these factors play against each other to determine the risk level in the system.
3.2 Supply Chain Risk Assessment Procedure
Supply chain risk analysis is distinctively different from traditional risk analysis due the
presence of complex interrelationships among business entities. The method proposed in
this thesis to analyze risks in a supply chain has been derived from the methodology
developed by the National Institute of Justice to assess vulnerability of chemical plants
and Military Standard 882 D [13, 55]. The National Institute of Justice developed a
prototype model to assess the vulnerabilities in a chemical facility. Even though the
technique has been specifically developed for a chemical facility, the underlying concepts
can be extended to a supply chain. Risk analysis of a supply chain is broadly divided into
seven steps.
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They are:
1. Asset ldentification
2. Asset screening
3. Activity Identification
4. Activity Screening
5. Threat ldentification
6. Threat Assessment
7.	 Risk Quantification
3.2.1 Asset Identification
Asset is anything that has a monetary or operational value. Assets include but not limited
to people, facilities, equipment and stocks. Identification of assets is first and foremost
step in risk analysis. Asset identification also enables a better understanding of the supply
chain and its vulnerabilities. The asset identification can be performed at various level of
detail. The extent to which the assets need to be identified should be in accordance with
the objectives of the risk analysis. ldentifying trivial assets can be unproductive and will
waste of resources. Only priority assets should be identified.
ln the context of supply chain risk analysis, two types of assets are related to
facilities and logistics links. Defining an asset either as a facility or logistic link is broad
enough to fit it to any supply chain configuration. While facilities either manufacture or
store goods, logistics links ship them. This type of asset definition and identification also
helps in construction of a network model of the chain and eases asset identification as
facilities and logistics links are highly visible and can be easily identified.
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Asset Modeling
A facility is considered to consist of six major elements - site, materials, people, physical
structure, electric power and information. While site means the nearby adjoining areas to
the facility, all other terms are self- explanatory. The major inputs to a facility are raw
materials, parts/ sub assemblies, process chemicals, water and energy. Various operations
are carried in the facility to process the raw materials to manufacture a product. A block
diagram of a facility is shown in Figure 3.2
Figure 3.3 Block Diagram of a Logistics Unit.
Similarly, a logistics link consists of infrastructure, fuel, people, cargo and
information. The term infrastructure includes the type of transportation and the route
selected. Figure 3.3 shows the block diagram of a logistics link. The inputs to the
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logistics links are fuel, cargo and equipment. And, the output of the unit is delivered
cargo. When the productions units and the logistics links are linked a supply chain is
created. ln a chain, information and material flow along the chain to fulfill customer
requirements. While, material flow is almost unidirectional, information flow is arbitrary.
Often, information flow and information security is much more important because
information is crucial in operating a supply chain. Any disruption in data flow or breach
in information security could be fatal to the company. With new cyber threats emerging
every day, protecting data is becoming increasingly difficult. Therefore, information flow
is identified and modeled as a critical element in the supply chain model.
3.2.2 Asset screening
Once the assets are identified, the next logical step is to determine whether the asset is a
priority asset and if an assessment is required. Low priority assets, i.e. assets with less
significance, need not be further studied and analyzed. This step eliminates insignificant
assets. The idea behind eliminating assets is that a risk assessment of these assets may be
much expensive than the cost benefit or utility realized from the assessment. This step
determines the importance of the asset to the supply chain based on a few parameters like
number of people working in the facility or its importance to the supply chain. Based on
the parameters, a priority value is calculated that ranges between 1- 4, where 1 is the
highest priority value and 4 is the least. lf the priority value is 1 or 2 then an assessment
is required. Again, if the value is greater than 2, then an assessment is not necessarily
required but the supply chain manager may decide to perform an assessment. The
parameters used in determining the priority value are of two types: objective and
subjective parameters. For objective parameters, the quantitative value can be calculated.
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But, for subjective parameters the absolute value cannot be calculated and beliefs need to
be used instead. For example, the number of people working in a facility or the current
inventory level can be calculated but the attractiveness of the asset to an adversary carmot
be calculated and has to be approximated. Since, Facilities and Logistics links are two
different entities, the parameters used to calculate the asset value also differ.
3.2.2.1 Priority value calculation for a Facility.
	 Eight critical parameters have
been identified to estimate the importance of a Facility. As discussed above, the
parameter could be either objective or subjective. Again, the parameters can either have
two or four possible responses.
The parameters and their possible responses are:
• Is the quantity of hazardous materials stored in the facility greater than threshold
value
o Yes
o No
• Sole source supplier
o Yes
o No
• No of people that would be affected in the worst case scenario
o More than 100,000
o 10,000-100,000
o 1,000-9,999
o Less than 1,000
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• lmportance to the region
o Very Important
o Moderately Important
o Marginally Important
o Not lmportant
• Importance to the supply chain
o Very lmportant
o Moderately lmportant
o Marginally lmportant
o Not Important
• lmportance to the nation
o Very lmportant
o Moderately Important
o Marginally lmportant
o Not lmportant
• Recognizability
o Easily Recognizable
o Recognizable
o Somewhat Recognizable
o Not Recognizable
The first and foremost parameter is the amount of chemicals stored in a facility.
This parameter can have two responses, either "Yes" or "No". If the amount is greater
than threshold value as given in Federal regulation 40 CFR 68.130, then the response will
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be "Yes", other wise "No". lf the response to this parameter is "Yes", then the asset has a
priority value of 1 and an assessment is required. lf the response is "No" then the priority
value of the asset is 4. Analysis of remaining parameters is not required if the response to
the first parameter is "Yes" as a risk assessment has to be carried out irrespective of other
parameters. If the response is "No", then the second parameter is analyzed. The second
parameter like the first one has two possible responses, either "Yes" or "No". Again, if
the response is "Yes", then an assessment is required and rest of the parameters are
ignored. Parameters 1 and 2 are objective and their value depends on the data collected
from the facility. Parameters 3-8 are subjective and can have four possible responses as
given above. No solid data is available to estimate these parameters and they have to be
estimated using subjective knowledge. Each of the parameter is assigned a qualitative
term, which is in turn is converted into a quantitative value. For example recognizability
of an asset can be high, medium, low, and very low. Each of the terms is assigned a value
of 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Using qualitative values instead of quantitative is helpful as
these parameters are estimated based on beliefs. Beliefs carmot be measured on an
absolute scale and only a relative comparison can be done. For example, values 1-4 for
recognizability may not mean anything to the supply chain manager, but qualitative
values like high, medium make more sense. After a value has been assigned to
parameters 3-8, the overall priority value of the asset is calculated as the value of the
parameter with the highest priority rating.
3.2.2.2 Priority value calculation for a Logistic Link.
	 Priority value for a
logistics link is calculated on similar lines. The parameters used to calculate the priority
value and their possible responses are:
• Does the shipment cross national borders
o Yes
o No
• Does the shipment contain goods that attract the adversary
o Yes
o No
• Are there any alternative routes
o Yes
o No
• Hazardous or explosive materials
o Yes
o No
• Shipment visibility
o Highly visible
o Moderately visible
o Marginally visible
o Not visible
• Population density associated with the route
o High
o Medium
o Low
o Very Low
• Damage in the worst case scenario
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o High
o Medium
o Low
o Very Low
• Significance to supply chain operations
o Very lmportant
o Moderately Important
o Marginally Important
o Not lmportant
First four parameters can have two responses, while others have four responses. The
responses to first four parameters are either "Yes" or "No". lf the response to any one of
the parameter is "Yes", then a risk assessment is required. Parameters 5-8 can have four
possible responses and priority value is exactly as described for a facility.
3.2. 3 Activity Identification
Activity identification is the next step in risks assessment after asset screening. Activity is
defined as any operation or process that is carried out in a facility or logistics link to
fulfill customer requirements.
Activity identification is a very crucial step in risk analysis as the extent of
activity identification dictates the reliability of risk analysis. For example, the activity of
unloading the shipment from a trailer and storing it in a warehouse can be considered to
be a single activity or can be divided to sub-activities. The scope of the study has to be
determined by the supply chain manager based of the requirements of the assessment. A
highly detailed study may waste resources, while a low level study may not be effective
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in identifying all relevant threats. Once the activity has been identified, an activity type
is assigned. Broadly, the activity types in a facility could be storage, material handling,
manufacturing operations or waste management. These are not the only possible activity
types; the manager can decide to have more activity types based on the operations being
carried out in the facility. The idea behind assigning an activity type to the activities is
that similar activities will have a common set of characteristics that can be exploited to
simplify risk analysis process. For example, in a material handling activity threats would
be almost identical and irrespective of the stations between which the activity is carried
out.
After assigning an activity type, the activity is thoroughly studied and
characterized to determine its significance. A priority value is calculated for each activity
to check if an assessment is required. Each activity is prioritized based on its significance,
recognizability, accessibility and the amount of chemicals involved in the activity.
Priority Value Calculation
The priority value is calculated based on the following parameters:
• Involvement of hazardous chemicals
o Yes
o No
• Quantity of chemicals used
o 25 times greater than the threshold
o Between 10-25 times the threshold quantity
o Between 1-10 times the threshold quantity
o Less than the threshold
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• Frequency of the activity
o 100 % continuous
o 50-99% continuous
o 25- 49% continuous
o Less than 25 %
• Recognizability
o Highly Recognizable
o Moderately Recognizable
o Marginally Recognizable
o Not Recognizable
• Accessibility
o Highly Accessible
o Moderately Accessible
o Marginally Accessible
o Not Accessible
Each of the parameters is assigned a value ranging between 1-4, where 1 signifies
highest priority and 4 the least. lf a parameter has only two responses like true and false
then the true value is assigned a value of 1 and 4 for false. After, all the parameters are
evaluated and assigned a value, then the overall priority values is calculated as the sum of
values of all parameters. If any of the parameter is critical then the activity is a high
priority activity and an assessment is required. If any of parameter takes a value of 1 or 2
then an assessment is required. Otherwise, it is at the discretion of the supply chain
manager.
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3.2.4 Threat Identification
Threat is defined as an unwanted or unplarmed activity that might have a negative impact.
This stage involves identifying the threats against each of the identified activities. The
number of threats against an activity could be infinite. This step should therefore focus on
identifying only those threats that are relevant to the scope of the study. Threats can be
broadly divided into three categories: intentional threats, accidental threats and natural
hazards. The frequency with which accidental threats and natural hazards occur can be
estimated by studying the past occurrence patterns. These threats are more or less static
and the past is considered to be a good reflection of the future. Intentional threats on the
other hand have a human motivation and are very dynamic. The adversary is intelligent
and his attack is preplarmed. He selects his targets with due diligence and can change his
tactics any time.
lt is very difficult to predict when, how and where he will attack. The number of
potential adversaries like the number of threats is also infinite. lnformation relating to
adversary's intents, capabilities and beliefs is rarely available to the commercial industry
and without much of this information estimating the probability of occurrence would be
difficult if not impossible. Also, these threats call for advances in system analysis, data
fusion, and artificial intelligence.
An alternative way to handle this type of threats would be to identify the system
vulnerabilities and study how these vulnerabilities would affect the system response. For
example, the probability of a supply link being disrupted due to low inventory levels can
be studied instead of studying a supply chain disruption due to a bomb explosion on the
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highway. This type of analysis will be performed within the boundaries of the supply
chain and does not require critical, sensitive and often confidential data.
3.2.5 Threat Assessment
Threat assessment phase examines the threats to estimate the probability of occurrence
and severity of consequences. The complexity of this phase depends on the desired level
of detail and scope of the analysis. The frequency of occurrence and severity of
consequences can be estimated using subjective knowledge or a detailed engineering
analysis can be performed. Frequency of occurrence can be estimated through fault trees
analysis. Fault tree analysis often requires a very detailed study of the system and may
take considerable time and effort to construct a fault tree. Likewise, severity of
consequences can be estimated by developing complex simulation models like a blast
analysis. Choice of the technique to assess threats depends on resource availability.
Simulation models can be very expensive and also require significant amount of time and
effort. However, they are much more reliable and yield better results. With simulation,
events that carmot be tested in real time can be analyzed in a virtual environment.
Developing highly complex simulation models may hinder the very reason for
performing a risk analysis. The required level of detail also depends on the product in
consideration. For example, risk analysis of an explosive/hazardous product like bombs
or grenades has to be very elaborate and extensive, but for a household appliance the
analysis need not be extensive.
3.2.5.1 Probability of Occurrence. 	 Probability of occurrence illustrates the rate
with which the threat is expected to occur. This can be either calculated quantitatively or
qualitatively. Using qualitative terms to estimate the frequency of occurrence is more
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recommendable as the data required to assign a quantitative value is rarely available and
has to be estimated based on subjective beliefs. For example, it may not be possible to
estimate absolute frequency value with which an earthquake in New York City or a mid
air head-on collision of two jet planes will occur. Even if a quantitative value were
assigned it would be very difficult to interpret and understand. For example, a probability
value of 10 -10 for an air crash is difficult to comprehend. Qualitative values on the other
hand are easy to understand and are intuitive. The probability of occurrence of a mid air
collision can be easily assigned as "lmprobable". For frequency of occurrence, Military
standard 882D recommends five levels for frequency of occurrence [55].
Military standard defines the frequency of occurrence levels as:
Frequent: Likely to occur often in the life of an item, with a probability of occurrence
greater than 10 -1 in that life.
Probable: Will occur several times in the life of an item, with a probability of
occurrence less than 10 -1 but greater than 10-2 in that life.
Occasional: Likely to occur some time in the life of an item, with a probability of
occurrence less than 10 -2 but greater than 10 -3 in that life.
Remote: Unlikely but possible to occur in the life of an item, with a probability of
occurrence less than 10-3 but greater than 10 -6 in that life.
Improbable: So unlikely, it can be assumed occurrence may not be experienced, with a
probability of occurrence less than 10 -6 in that life.
The only problem in using qualitative terms is that there is a certain amount of
overlap between the adjacent levels. For borderline cases, the supply chain manager has
to decide the probability level of the threat. The probability of occurrence can be
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estimated in two ways: using a simple analysis or fault tree analysis. A simple analysis is
a straightforward method to estimate the frequency of occurrence of the threat. ln this
method the analyst uses his subjective knowledge and intuitions to assign a probability
value. This technique does not consider the causal or triggering events and the enabling
scenarios. This approach is very rudimentary and is not recommended. However, if the
analyst feels that the threat is trivial and a detailed analysis is not required then this
method may be used.
Fault tree analysis is a very sophisticated technique to estimate the frequency of
occurrence of the identified threat (top event). This technique has been rigorously
researched and is based on well-established systems and reliability engineering concepts.
3.2.5.2 Fault Tree Analysis. Fault trees analysis is a deductive logic
analysis approach to identify the causal events and their interrelationships. ln this
approach, a top event is identified and it is analyzed thoroughly to identify the root
events. The results of a fault tree analysis are two fold: a pictorial representation of the
causal events and the probability of occurrence value of the top event. Fault tree analysis
is based on Boolean logic and uses Boolean arithmetic to calculate the probability of
occurrence of the top event. Fault trees basically have two types of nodes. They are gate
and event nodes. Gates nodes have one or more children and event nodes are the
independent events whose occurrence does not depend on other events. Events nodes are
known as leaf nodes and are the triggering events. Gates nodes are of two fundamental
types: "AND" and "OR" gates. ln a "AND" gate all the children need to happen
simultaneously to trigger the parent event. And, in an "OR" gate any one of the event can
trigger the parent event. Traditionally, each of the nodes in a tree can have two states.
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They are "True" and "False". However, having just two states will be very elementary
and the intermediate states carmot be accounted.
Combining Bayesian networks and fault trees will provide a unique capability.
With this approach, each event can have multiple states and new evidence can be
combined with the existing data to recalculate new probability value. Fault tree analysis
will be used to identify the causal events and to construct a network diagram. Bayesian
networks will then be used to deduct an inference on the frequency of occurrence of the
top event from the network structure. One of the main problems in using a Bayesian
networks lies in populating the conditional probability tables. For a parent node with four
children and five possible states for each node, 4 5 conditional probability values need to
be entered. This is a major obstacle that has been hindering the application of Bayesian
networks for years. To solve this problem, logical inference rules have been formulated.
With these rules, the conditional probability tables can be easily populated.
ln the proposed method, nodes can be of three types. They are: events, gates and
safeguards. While events and gates can have 5 different states, safeguards have only 4
states. The process starts with identification of the causal events that could lead to the
top event and the safeguards in place that prevent the occurrence of the unwanted event.
The identified causal events are further studied to identify possible sub-causes and
safeguards in place. The process is repeated until there are no further sub-causes or the
analyst is satisfied with the level of detail. For the leaf events and safeguards identified, a
probability of occurrence and protection level value is assigned respectively. The
probability of occurrence could be "Frequent", "Probable", "Occasional", "Remote" and
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"lmprobable". A safeguard provides four levels of protection. They are "High",
"Medium", "Low" and "Very Low".
The level of protection provided by a safeguard is defined as below:
High: Provides complete protection and completely nullifies occurrence of an
"Occasional" event
Medium: Provides major protection, and nullifies the probability of occurrence of a
"Remote" event
Lovv: Provides few protection measures and nullifies occurrence of a "lmprobable" event
Very Lovv: lneffective or no protection measures and events will occur with the same
frequency irrespective of the safeguard.
Logical rules, presented below, are used to populate the conditional probability tables
3.2.5.3 Logical Rules.	 P.L. Clemens proposed logical rules to perform a
qualitative fault tree analysis [56]. These rules have been adopted and modified to suit the
problem in consideration. A new set of rules has been added to incorporate safeguards
into the analysis. To calculate the probability value of a gate, the safeguards associated
with it are ignored in the first place and the probability of occurrence is calculated
irrespective of the safeguards. Then, all events are assumed as a single node with the
calculated probability of occurrence and the frequency of occurrence is recalculated with
the safeguard in place.
Rules for calculating the frequency of occurrence without safeguards
1. The frequency of occurrence of a "AND" gate is equal to the frequency of occurrence
of the most probable child if no two other children are at the same level. Example:
Probable, Occasional, Remote will be Probable.
2. The frequency of occurrence of an "OR" gate is equal to the frequency of
occurrence of the least probable child if no two other children are at the same level.
Example: Probable, Occasional, Remote will be Remote.
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3. lf an "AND" gate has three or more children having the highest level of probability of
occurrence among all children then the probability of occurrence of the parent will be
elevated to the next level. Example, Probable, Probable, Probable will be Frequent.
4. lf an "OR" gate has three or more children having the highest level of probability of
occurrence among all children then the probability of occurrence of the parent will be
reduced by one level. Example, Probable, Probable, Probable is occasional.
5. A safeguard providing "High" level of protection will reduce the frequency of
occurrence by three levels. Example: If the event frequency is "High" and safeguard
provides a high level of protection then the effective frequency of occurrence would
be "occasional".
6. A safeguard providing "Medium" level of protection will reduce the frequency of
occurrence by two levels.
7. A safeguard providing "Low " level of protection will reduce the frequency of
occurrence by one level
8. A safeguard providing "Very Low" level of protection will affect the frequency of
occurrence.
3.2.5.4 Inference Technique. 	 After the conditional probability tables have been
populated, an inference is deducted using Bayesian networks. Numerous software
packages are available that would perform the Bayesian Inference. These software's use
various algorithms like variable elimination algorithm, and junction tree algorithm to
calculate the probability of occurrence. Notable among the software's is "Netica" from
Norsys group. This software has been successfully used in "Site Profiler" and can be
interfaced with most of the programming languages.
3.2.5.5 EDample. Let disruption of manufacturing operations at a facility to be one of
the identified threats. Disruption could be due to shortage of raw materials or due to a
power failure. Power failure could be due to a transmission failure or due to the tripping
of the circuit breaker. Shortage of raw materials can be related to delay in shipment
arrival or to problems on the supplier side. Delay in shipment arrival can be due to a
vehicle failure or delays at the port. Supplier might be facing material shortages or high
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product failure rates due to which he is not able to supply on time. Two safeguards have
been placed to maintain the continuity of operations. One, an electric generator is
installed that could be used as a backup in case of a power failure. Two, a backup
supplier is kept who could supply whenever there is a shortage of supplies from the
primary supplier. The fault tree is shown graphically in Figure 3.3. ln this tree, the top
event is the disruption of operations. The tree contains four "OR" gates, five events and
two safeguards.
Gates are:
1. Power Failure
2. Shortage of supplies
3. Delay in shipment arrival
4. Supplier problem
Events:
1. Circuit breaker trips
2. Transmission Failure
3. Material shortages
4. High product failure rates
5. Vehicle failure
6. Port delays
Safeguards:
1. Alternative supplier
2. Generator
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Assume the safeguards, alternative supplier and generator, provide a high level of
protection. Let the frequency of occurrence of the events be:
Circuit breaker tripping — occasional
Transmission Failure — remote
Material shortages — remote
High product failure rates — occasional
Vehicle failure- occasional
Port delay- improbable
For gates, the frequency of occurrence is calculated using the logical rules
formulated. Under normal conditions Netica calculates the frequency of occurrence of the
top event as occasional. The captured screen of the simulated fault free is given in Figure
3.5. lf new information is obtained like Vehicle failure is frequent then threat level
automatically elevates to Probable. The captured screen for inference with evidence is
shown in Figure 3.6.
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3.2.7 Consequence Analysis
Consequence analysis is the second step in threat assessment. ln a supply chain, there
could be a variety of consequences ranging from persormel loss to loss of customer good
will. All of these consequences can be converted into a monetary value. Although
monetary loss is one of the biggest concerns to companies, it is not the only concern.
Persormel safety and environmental protection are equally important. Even though, both
of these parameters can be converted into a monetary value, but it is not recommendable
to assign values to assets such as employees and environment. For the purpose of
analyzing risks in a supply chain three major types of consequences have been
considered.
They are:
1. Monetary loss
2. Persormel Loss
3.	 Environmental Damage
Each of the above parameter can have four different levels. They are: "Catastrophic",
"Moderate", "Marginal" and "Negligible". The definitions of each of these have been
adopted from the Mil Standard 88 D and are as given below.
Catastrophic: Death or permanent total disability of personnel, monetary loss exceeding
1 million US dollars or irreversible environmental damage violating laws and regulations
Critical: Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness resulting in loss of
at least three persormel, monetary loss exceeding 200 thousand US dollars or reversible
environmental damage violation laws and regulations
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Marginal: lnjury or occupational illness resulting in one or more work days, monetary
loss exceeding ten thousand, or mitigable environmental damage where restoration
activities can be undertaken
Negligible: Injury or illness not leading to loss of work days, loss exceeding 2000 US
dollars, or minimal environmental damage without violating laws and regulations.
The numbers in the definitions have been directly taken from the military specification
and need to be changed to be in accordance with the supply chain in consideration.
3.2.8 Risk Quantification
Risk quantification is the final step in the risk assessment procedure. In this step the risk
value is estimated and checked against the acceptable risk level. The threat assessment
stage comes up with qualitative terms for frequency of occurrence and severity of
consequences. A numerical value is assigned to each of these qualitative terms to
estimate the risk value quantitatively. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 give the values assigned to
frequency of occurrence and severity of consequences. These values are not absolute and
do not indicate or suggest anything on their own. For example a value of 0.1 for
probability of occurrence does not indicate that the event happen once in every 1000
times the operation is carried out. The values are relative to each other and indicate the
relationship between the terms. For example, if a value of 0.1 and 0.001 is assigned to
"Frequent" and "Probable" events then the values indicate that a "Frequent " event is 100
times more likely to occur than a "Occasional" event.
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3.2.9 Acceptable Risk Level
Setting the acceptable risk level is a management question and depends on the type of the
supply chain in question. For example, health care and defense industry may need to have
stringent risk limits while companies selling personal care goods may not have high
acceptable risk levels. Acceptable risk level depends on how much risk the firm can take
without hurting business. Acceptable risk level is a trade off between effectiveness and
efficiency. Complete elimination of risks may not be possible and may go against the
interests of the firm. Certain amount of risk has to be taken to do business profitably.
Acceptable risk level has to be set with due diligence. Setting it too high will adversely
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affect business due increased safeguard cost and setting it too low will not provide
adequate protection.
The acceptable limit can be set a combination of frequency of occurrence and
severity of consequences. These qualitative terms will then be converted into a numerical
value to check against the risk factor for each threat! activity pair. If the risk factor is
greater than the acceptable limit then safeguards need to identified and implemented to
reduce the risk level. Figure 3.7 summarizes the risk assessment procedure. After the
safeguards have been implemented, steps through threat assessment and risk
quantification need to be iterated until the risk factor is acceptable. lf the risk factor is
still unacceptable after implementing all possible safeguards then either the process or
acceptable risk level needs to be changed.
After this stage a report is generated listing the risk factor with each activity!threat
pair. The report will also identify high-risk threats. For the high-risk threats, safeguards
are identified and implemented to reduce the risk level to acceptable levels.
Figure 3.7 Risk Assessment Flow Chart.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Computer Based Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Management System
Risk analysis is a highly data intensive subject and a manual analysis is too arduous. A
manual analysis often works against the very reason for doing the assessment. Computer
based systems have the ability to handle large volumes of data and to identify the patterns
in the data that are not visible to a human eye. These systems provide high computational
power and can perform elaborate calculations within minutes. Computer based risk
assessment systems can ease the assessment process and account for data changes
without any difficulty. ln a manual risk assessment, it might take a significant amount of
time to incorporate minor data changes and a real time continuous risk assessment will be
far from reality. Computers are highly sought for to perform data intensive applications
and provide unmatched speed and accuracy.
Developing computer based systems as a web-application further enhances its
capabilities. With the client — server architecture the system can be accessed from any
place in the world with a computer having a web-browser like Microsoft Internet
Explorer.
A web-enabled computer based system has been developed that guides the risk
assessment process and calculates the risk factor with each activity. The system has been
developed considering a supply chain manager who is conversant with supply
management principles but may not be knowledgeable of risk assessment procedure.
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4.2 System Architecture
The system architecture of the risk analysis system is given in Figure 4.1. lt has
been developed using Microsoft Active Server Pages with an Access database. At this
stage, it is a stand — alone system but will later be integrated with BRP and legacy
databases. Also, modules to extract design data from computer aided design files will be
embedded into the system. The system guides and performs the risk analysis by
collecting supply chain and process information.
First, the system logs in the user with a user name and password. Second, the
supply chain model is entered into the system through facility and logistics link
identification. After model construction, each facility is scrutinized to determine whether
an assessment is required. If an assessment is required then each activity in that facility
is identified and characterized to determine activity significance.
A risk assessment is not required unless and until an activity is significant to the
business. lf it is identified to be a significant activity, then the threats are identified and
assessed. Supply chain operations, site information and process information data will be
extracted from the BRP and other databases to characterize and prioritize the assets and
operations.
Group technology concepts will be embedded into the system to automate threat
identification process. Group technology takes advantage of similarities between entities
to reduce the workload. For example, if two different products have almost the same
design, then the most of the manufacturing processes will also be the same.
Figure 4.1 System Architecture.
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ln the same way, if the activities are of the same type then the threats will also be
identical. Again, the threats will also depend on the process being carried out and the product
design. After threat identification, each threat is assessed for estimating the risk factor. After the
risk factor is calculated a report is generated. lf the risk level is not acceptable then the
safeguards are identified and simulated to evaluate their effectives and to identify the most
appropriate safeguard.
4.3 Software Description
Security is an important issue while developing a web-application. As data is online, without
sufficient security measures, anybody could access and modify it. Risk analysis deals with
sensitive and confidential data, which is often proprietary. Only authorized users need to be able
to access the database. Bach authorized user is provided with a unique user name and password,
which is stored in a database. Figure 4.3 shows the captured login screen. Bvery time the user
tries to log in, the user name and password are matched with the records in the database. Only if
a match is found, the user is logged in. On successful login, the user is automatically directed to
the menu page, where he is provided with two options. Bither he could start a new assessment or
continue with an existing assessment. Figure 4.4 shows the captured page for this step.
The risk assessment procedure is carried out in six different phases. Figure 4.2 lists all the
phases in risk analysis with their inputs and outputs.
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The phases are:
1. Supply chain model description
2. Asset screening
3. Activity ldentification
4. Threat Identification
5. Consequence Analysis
6. Report Generation
4.3.1 Supply Chain Description
In this phase, a network model of the supply chain is constructed by identifying the facilities and
logistics links in the chain. First, the facilities and transportation modes are identified and entered
into the system using textboxes. Second, logistics links are identified and entered into the system
using dropdown boxes. The logistics link is entered into the system by selecting the origin and
destination facilities and the transportation mode from the dropdown boxes. Figure 4.5 shows
the web-page implementation of this phase. After the supply chain is entered into the system, a
network model of the supply chain is generated. The network model graphically depicts the
facilities and the logistics links in the chain. A sample network model is shown in Figure 4.6.
Also, a tree view of the supply chain is generated. The tree view displays information in a
hierarchical order. ln this case, the facilities are listed first, and then the corresponding linked
facilities and possible transportation modes in a hierarchical order. These trees can be expanded
or compacted as required. ln this page clicking a facility name will list the linked facilities. The
tree structure is a very powerful tool to present the data in a concise format.
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4.3.2 Screening
This phase identifies the high priority facilities and logistics links. As discussed earlier in
Chapter 3, the priority value for each facility or logistics link is calculated based on eight
parameters.
To characterize a facility or logistics link, it is selected from the dropdown box. A
logistics link is selected by selecting the origin and destination facility and the
transportation mode. These boxes are interdependent and are analogues to the dropdown
boxes used for selecting a state and city in which the entries in the city dropdown box
depend on the state selected. Likewise, the entries in the destination facility box depend
on the starting facility selected. Also, the list of facilities and logistics links is in the drop
down boxes is dynamic. The facility or logistics link is automatically taken off from the
list once it has been screened for a risk assessment. This page calculates the priority value
based on the parameter values entered by the user. If an assessment is not required then
the system prompts the user to make a decision. The screening information entered is
stored in a database and displayed as a tree view on the left hand side. The tree view
displays values of all parameters and the requirement for an assessment. Figure 4.7 and
4.8 show the web implementation of this phase for a facility and logistics link
respectively.
4.3.3 Activity Identification
For the high priority facilities and logistics links that need an assessment, the various
activities that are carried out are identified, characterized and entered into the system.
The characterization is based on the parameters discussed in chapter 3. ln this phase, a
facility or logistics link is selected first and then an activity type. An activity can be
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entered into the system either through a textbox or can be selected from the dropdown
box. The idea behind selecting the activity type in the first place is that the system will
automatically generate a list of possible activities based on the selected activity type.
The system scans through the database and selects all activities with the selected
activity type. This technique has two advantages. One, it benefits from other risk
assessments and two, reduces the thought process. Based on the responses to the
parameters, the system calculates the priority value for the activity and determines
whether an assessment is required or not. lf the system determines that activity is not of
high priority then the system asks the user whether he still wants to perform the
assessment. The captured pages for this phase are shown in Figure 4.9 and 4.10.
4.3.4 Threat Identification
ln this phase, threats are identified and entered into the system. The captured screen for
this page is shown in Figure 4.11. For adding a threat, the corresponding facility or
logistics link and the activity are selected from the drop-down box. A threat can be added
into the system in two ways. The threat could be either selected from the dropdown box
or a new threat can be entered using the text box. The system populates the drop-down
threat box by identifying possible threats based on the activity type. The system runs
through the database and selects threats with the same activity type as that of the selected
activity.
Frequency of occurrence is also entered in this page. Frequency of occurrence can
be either estimated using beliefs or a full fault tree analysis can be performed. This page
also offers the capability to perform a full fault free analysis. In case of a fault tree
analysis, a cause is identified and entered into the system. For the identified cause, a
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cause type is assigned. As discussed in chapter 3, the cause could be a gate, event or
safeguard. lf it is an event or safeguard, then the frequency of occurrence or protection
level is assigned respectively. For a gate, the system calculates the frequency level using
logical rules. For each cause identified a parent is assigned. Possible parents for the cause
are listed in the drop-down box. Once, the fault tree is constructed, the system calculates
the frequency of occurrence of the top event by using the logical rules and stores it in a
database. The tree view on the left side of the page lists all threats and their frequency of
occurrence.
4.3.5 Consequence Analysis
Consequence analysis is the last step before generating the reports. The captured screen
for this phase is shown in Figure 4.12. The identified threats are grouped by activity
type. ln this phase, the activity type is selected first from the dropdown box. On selecting
the activity type, the box listing the threats will be automatically populated. Bach threat is
assessed based on three parameters: persormel loss, monetary loss and environmental
damage. Based on the user responses the severity of consequences is calculated.
4.3.6 Report Generation
This the last phase in risk assessment. ln this phase, reports are each generated either for
facilities or logistics links. The report is in a tabular form, where the rows and columns
represent the activity and threats respectively. For each activity—threat pair the risk value
is calculated. Sample reports are shown in Figure 4.13 and 4.14.
Analysis and Manage
Edit I View Registration Information
Dent System
Logout
Supply Chain 
Home 
Address 1. http://localhostithsiNewAssessmerit/FacilityScreening.asp it 
Description Screening Event Identification 	 Threat identification Consequence Analysis Report Generation     
31 Facility Description - Microsoft Internet Explorer  
	 Irx
File 	 Edit View Favorites 	 Tools Help
0 Back Search 	 Favorites Media ,€)           
Facility Logistics 
IVIM106
Facilities
Tree created using ASP Tree View
Select a Facility : r—S-e-
1 . Does it house chemicals in quantities greater than the threshold ?
2. Is any item manufactured exclusively at this facility ?
3. How many people will be affected in the worst-case scenario ?
4. How important is it to the Nation ?
5. How important is it to the supply chain ?
6. How important is it to the region ?
7. Is the facility easily recognizable by adversaries ?
8. Is it accessible to adversaries ?
No
No
Less than 1,000
Not Important
Not Important
Not Important
Not Recognizable
Not Accessible  
Proceed To Logistics ScreeningSave Information     
MAIM York Center   
1411.0z:., 1,7-1
_  Local irtrariet      
Figure 4.7 Captured Screening Page for  a Facility.
Figure 4.8 Captured Screening Page for a Logistics Link.
Figure 4.9 Captured Activity ldentification Page for a Facility.
LogoutHome Edit I View Registration Information
Report GenerationThreat Identification Consequence AnalysisActivity IdentificationDescription 	 Screening
Logistics
Proceed to Logistics Event Identification
II 
Local iritrariet
Enter Activity Info for Facility - Microsoft
File Edit 	 View 	 Favorites 	 "rode Help
Back 	- (al ,LA ell I (tat  Search al Favorites Media
Address 141 http://localhostithsPlesigAssessmentiFacilityfriatrix.asp
I 	 j
Links ",
Cupp y Chain Risk Analysis and Management System
Duration lin hrs
or Enter a new activity
%ERGYork Center
1. List the chemicals involved in this activity ?
2
3 What is the quantity of chemicals involved ?
4 How frequently is this activity carried out ?
5 Is the activity recognizable by adversaries ?
6 Is the activity premises accessible to adversaries ?
Does the activity involve hazardous or explosive chemicals ? I
None
I < 25 % Continuous
1 Not recognizable
No
< Threshold quantity
Not accessible
Select a Facility :
Activity Type 	 :
Select a activity :
Factory 	 21.1
!Material Handling -PP
Forklift to Bunker
MM1O5
Fl Facilities
Tree created using ASP Tree View
Save Information
Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Management System
Home Edit I View Re* castration information Lo * out  
Description 	 Screening Activity Identification
Facility 	 Logistics
Threat Identification Consequence Analysis Report Generation
[None
No
l< Threshold Quantity
< 25 Qontinous
EN-o-t Recognizable
I Not Accessible
Logistics Event 	
File Edit View Favorites Tools Help
Back v 	 Ci31 VA 	 I 	Search Favorites 	 I Media
Address IC http://localhostjths/NewAssessmerit/LogisticsMatrix.asp
MM105
0 ° Facilities
.- Tree crested using ASP Tree View
Select a Route: From : Asp 	 To :
Activity Type
	
'Air Transportation
Select an Activity I
	 Select 	
1 . List the chemicals involved in this activity ?
2 Does the activity involve hazardous or explosive chemicals ?
3 What is the quantity of chemicals involved ?
4 How frequently is this activity carried out ?
5 Is the shipment recognizable by adversaries ?
6 Is the shipment accessible to adversaries ?
Save Information 	 Proceed to Threat Identification           
Gun Fire
	
Mode : Truck
Duration irnTirs
or Enter a new activity                                  
1141.11111111° York Center
a Local Intranet
Figure 4.10 Captured Logistics Activity Identification Page.
Fault tree analysis
CauseiSafeguard Name 	
Type Select 	 P,ient 	
I Save Information Calculate Frequency
oerj Donemonist , Local Intranet
.31 Facility Threat Identification - Microsoft Internet Explorer
File 	 Edit View Favorites Tools Help  
0 Back - 	zeal 	4) 	Search	 Favorites   Media     
Address http://localhostithsiNewAssessmerit/FacilityThreatIderitificatiori.asp    o 	 Aortort AntiVirus 	•••    
Supply Chain Risk Analyser rid
	
end System
Home Edit / View Registration Information Logout   
Description Screening Activity Identification Three dent cation Consequence Analysis Report Generation
Facility Logistics    
IVIIV1105
Facilities
Tree created using ASP Tree View
Select a Facility r-selecl ----- 	Select an Event i 	Select- s,
Select a Threat I -select-- 	OR Enter a New Threat
Simple Analysis
Frequency
	
Occasional v.
I Save Information
Proceed To Log Threat Identification  
1P41.11111r York Center  
Figure 4.11
 Facility Threat ldentification.
Consequence Analysis Report Generation 
Facility Logistics 
a Threat
Facility Event Identification - Microsoft Internet Explorer
	 17;1FTII
File Edit View Favorites Tools Help
0 Back - ' 1 „„, 	Search	 Favorites
Address 46 http iflocalhostiths/NewAssessrrient/FacilityCorisequences .asp
Supply Ch n Riskn !yrs' and V, n ge en 	 item  
Edit! View Registration Information LogoutHome      
Media Big
Description Screening Event Characterization Threat identification
Select a Phase :   	Select	  
El
..
 MM1O5
El Storage-ST-Non-Hostile
Tree created using ASP Tree View 
What could be the expected personnel loss ?
Death or permanent total disability
Permanent partial disability, injuries or occupational illness resulting in hospitalization of at least three personnel
Injury or occupational illness resulting in one or more lost work days
Injury or illness not leading to loss of a work day
What could be the monetary loss due to the threat?
Greater than one million US dollars
Greater than 20O thousand US dollars but less than one million
Greater than 10 thousand US dollars but less than 200 thousand
Greater than 2 thousand but less than 10 thousand
What could be the environmental damage?
Irreversible severe environmental damage violating law and regulations
Reversible environmental damage violating law and regulation
Mitigable environmental damage without violating law and regulation
Minimal environmental damage without violating law and regulation      
. 	 . 	_
Proceed to Logistics Consequence Analysis      Save Information                                 
41 Done      Local iritranet            
Figure 4.12 Facility Consequence Analysis.
STORAGEIAUTO IGNITION BATTERY INITIATES FIRE
BUNKER STORAGE! 1.00E-121 	 1.00E-10
	
1.00E-12 	 11.00E-08
Local iritrariet
Report Generation - Facility - Microsoft Internet Explorer
	
15/ 	
File 	 Edit View	 Favorites
	
Tools 	 Help
 	 10 Back 	ALAI 	Search	 Favorites
Address Ida http://localhostithsiNewAssessmerit/FacilltyReportGerieration.asp
Media           
Nortori AntiVirus     
Supply Chain Risk Analysis and Management System
Home Edit I View Registration Information Logout  
Description Screening Event Characterization Threat identification Consequence Analysis Report Generation     
Facility Logistics 
E MM105
-
•
 Facilities
CI Screening Information
W- 1 Event Information
P Threats
- Consequences
l 	Modes
Tree created using ASP Tree View
----7—
4** Select a Facility FF.- actor)/ Stdre.ge
Set Acceptable Risk Level : Select Select
.41.11111r
4:1 Dorie
York Center
MEW	
Figure 4.13 Facility Report Generation.
Figure 4.14 Logistics Link Report Generation.
CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDY
5.1 Case Study — Highly Explosive Product
The risk analysis methodology developed in this research work is tested with a case study
provided by Picatirmy Arsenal. The case study deals with the supply chain of a Dual-
Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPlCM) cartridge. The supply chain starts
with a manufacturing plant and ends at a forward field point where the cartridge is used.
The purpose of this study is to identify high-risk threats, which may occur during the
lifecycle of the product.
5.2 Hardware Description [55]
The DPlCM cartridge was developed for use in the howitzer gun to leverage light
infantry divisions capabilities and to make them more lethal. When fired with a
supercharge, the extended range DPlCM cartridge permits mass fires across the division
front and improves survivability of the troops. This cartridge also allows engagement of
deep targets that was not possible with the previous cartridge.
The DPlCM uses a supercharge to improve the projectile range. The cartridge
contains a submunition payload of 42 Dual Purpose grenades. The projectile uses a one-
piece all steel carrier, which is internally scalloped to contain the cargo without additional
hardware. The grenade uses a new Electronic Self Destruct Fuse. This fuse will reduce
the number of DPlCM duds in the battlefield. Also, the fuse will be reasonably safe for
friendly maneuvering or advancing troops.
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5.3 Supply Chain Description
The supply chain of the DPlCM cartridge consists of nine facilities and twenty-three
logistics links. Facilities are of two types: production plant or storage facility.
Facilities considered in the supply chain are:
• Factory
• Factory Storage
• Proving Ground
• CONUS Storage (Continental United States)
• OCONUS Storage (Outside Continental United States)
• Pre-Pro Ship (Pre-Position Ship)
• ASP (Ammunition Supply Point)
• Demil
• Gunfire
The logistics links are listed in Table 5.1. The supply chain model is depicted graphically
in Figure 5.1. ln this supply chain, the explosive product is manufactured at the factory
and shipped and stored at Factory storage, CONUS Storage, OCONUS Storage, Proving
Ground and Pre-Pro Ship using trucks and rail. From these storage points, the product is
further shipped to ASP and Demil facility. From Ammunition Supply Point, the product
is shipped to a forward point where it is deployed. Supply lines are also maintained
between, CONUS, OCONUS and pre-pro ship to ensure supply continuity.
Figure 5.1 Supply Chain of DPlCM Cartridge.
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Table no 5.1 List of Logistics Links.
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In this study, it is assumed that all the facilities as well as logistics links require a risk
assessment as information characterizing each of the facility and logistics link was not
provided. Also, since each of the stage involves a highly explosive product, it is
imperative that each entity will require a risk assessment. Table 5.2 lists the various
activities and corresponding threats in facility — Factory. Also, the duration of activity
and activity type are listed in the table. The activities for the rest facilities and logistics
links are added in Appendix-A as tables.
5.4 Threat Assessment
Bach of the identified threat is assessed to estimate the frequency of occurrence and
severity of consequences. The estimated frequency of occurrence values is given along
with the threats in Table 5.2. For estimating the severity of consequences, the threats are
grouped by activity type and then assessed. Table 5.3 and 5.4 list the consequences for
facilities and logistics links. The consequence values have been obtained either through
simulations or subjective knowledge.
The acceptable risk level is set at Occasional and Moderate, which is equivalent to a
value of 1040 . The risk assessment reports generated for facilities Factory and Factory
Storage are shown in Table 5.5 to 5.6. Reports of the rest of the facilities and logistics
links are given in Appendix B. The rows and columns of the table represent the activities
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and threat, respectively. lf a threat does not exist against an activity then "NA" in the cell
indicates it. Otherwise, the risk factor is calculated and displayed. Red color cells indicate
that the risk level is not acceptable, while green suggests that risk level is acceptable.
Table 5.4 List of Logistics Consequences
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Table 5.5 Risk Assessment Report for Factory
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Risk assessment reports indicate that any event resulting in a detonation pose a high risk.
As long as the grenade does not detonate, the risk level is acceptable. Also, all activities
at Ammunition Supply Point and Gunfire pose a high risk due to proximity to the
adversary. Even for these sites, the acceptable risk level is set at Occasional and
Moderate. However, the acceptable risk level has to be relaxed considering the possibility
of a mishap is always high in a battle field.
Since any event triggering the grenade is unacceptable, a new safety trip has to be
designed to be placed along with the grenade fuse. ln case of an unwanted event, the
safety trip will deactivate the grenade preventing an explosion.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Conclusion
Supply chain security is of utmost importance to sustain business in an uncertain
and high-risk business environment. Recent events highlighted the vulnerabilities of the
supply chains and proved that the current business continuity plans do not provide
adequate security. Since, a supply chain is a highly complex system of interdependent
entities, the current risk assessment techniques are inadequate to assess risks in a supply
chain. New decisions tools are required that will help development on business
continuity plans based on a complete risk assessment of the supply chain. Also, none of
the current risk analysis technique is capable of assessing risks in a supply chain due to
interdependencies among businesses.
A supply chain risk assessment technique is proposed in this thesis that is capable
of identifying high-risk threats in a supply chain. The methodology has been validated
with a real case study provided by Picatinny Arsenal, the United States Army Armament
Research, Development and Bngineering Center.
The results show that the methodology is efficient. Also, results show that
operational and strategic decisions based on the risk estimates will help in more rational
decision-making and appropriate resource allocation. ln the case study, for example, any
event not leading to a fire is not of high significance. Resources need not be diverted to
prevent the occurrence of such an event. However, any event that leads to a fire needs to
be avoided and the asset ! activity have to be safeguarded.
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The fault tree analysis approach shows that supply chain interrelationships among
businesses can be accounted while calculating the frequency of occurrence value. The use
of qualitative probability values is intuitive and offers an easy method to assign the
frequency of occurrence value. High data necessity has been one of the problems with
Bayesian networks and other inference techniques. The logical rules formulated indicate
that the data requirement and data entry can be relaxed.
Preliminary results indicate that the methodology can be applied to any supply
chain as they can be divided into production and logistics units. The system guides the
risk assessment process and estimates the risk factor associated with each activity — threat
pair. Also, the system is one of its kinds built upon Military Standards to estimate risk in
a supply chain.
6.2 Future Work
This research work is a major step toward the development of the next generation
risk management tool. Roshan Pai, working collaboratively within the MBRC research
team, is developing a safeguard analysis module that can directly integrate with the risk
assessment system developed in this thesis. Novel techniques like gaming theory and
fuzzy logic are being considered to identify the most appropriate safeguard.
The utility of inference techniques for assessing risk in a supply chain is still not
clear. Bven though Bayesian networks have the capability to account for
interrelationships, their drawbacks are not yet known. Different inference techniques
need to be used and results analyzed to study their relative benefits and drawbacks. One
of the major drawbacks in such an analysis is that the risk values are conservative and are
not on an absolute scale. This makes the study much more complex.
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The system needs to be further developed for an automated monitoring of the
supply chain. Fault tree structures and inference engines need to further studied and better
integrated to allow a real time risk analysis. Also, data sources need to be identified and
integrated to the system so that system automatically collects new information and
updates risk levels.
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APPENDIX A
(Continued)
Table A.20 Threat List for Pre-Pro Ship to ASP: Truck
Activity Duration
(Hrs)
Threats Frequency Activity Type
Crane!
Forklift
to
Truck
1 Forklift Tines Punctures Container
Pallet Falls
Pierside Fire
Reaction with Cargo
Sniper Bullet
Probable
Occasional
Remote
Remote
Remote
Land
Transportation
Truck
to ASP
48 Gunfire from Aircraft
Pallet Falls
Missile Attack
Shaped Charge Attack
Fire Accident
Reaction with ltems
Probable
Probable
Probable
Probable
Probable
Probable
Land
Transportation
■■■■■■
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APPENDIX A
(Continued)
Table A.22 Threat List for CONUS Storage to ASP: Air
Activity Duration
(Hrs)
Threats Frequency Activity Type
Truck to
Airport
168 Truck Fire
Detonation
Bullet Punctures Container
Truck Accident
Remote
Remote
Remote
Remote
Land
Transportation
Forklift
to Plane
0.3 Forklift Tines Punctures Container
Bullet Punctures Container
Pallet Falls
Probable
Remote
Occasional
Land
Transportation
Plane to
ASP
Airport
24 Takeoff!Landing Fire
Reaction with Cargo
Detonation
Remote
Remote
Remote
Air
Transportation
Forklift
to Truck
0.3 Forklift Tines Punctures Container
Pallet Falls
Probable
Occasional
Land
Transportation
Truck to
ASP
168 Gunfire from Aircraft
Pallet Falls
Missile Attack
Shaped Charge Attack
Fire Accident
Reaction with items
Probable
Probable
Probable
Probable
Probable
Probable
Land
Transportation
1,1A 
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APPENDIX B
(Continued)
Table B.2 Risk Assessment Report for CONUS Storage (Continued)
Reaction with ltems Storage Truck Accident
Bunker Storage 1.00E-08 1.00E-10 NA
Forklift to Bunker ii0E-08 NA NA
Forklift to Rail NA NA NA
Forklift to Truck NA NA NA
Truck to Bunker NA NA 1.00E-14
Truck Fire
Bunker Storage NA
Forklift to Bunker NA
Forklift to Rail NA
Forklift to Truck NA
Truck to Bunker 1.00E-08
Table B.3 Risk Assessment Report for CONUS Storage
Auto lgnition Battery lnitiates Fire
Bunker Storage 1.00E-08 1.00E-08 1.00E-08
Forklift to Bunker NA NA NA
Forklift to Truck NA NA NA
Forklift Tines
Puncture container Pallet Falls
Reaction with
ltems
Bunker Storage NA NA 1.00E-08
Forklift to Bunker 1.00E-12 1.00E-10 NA
Forklift to Truck 1.00E-12 1.00E-10 NA
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APPENDIX B
(Continued)
Table B.21 Risk Assessment Report for CONUS Storage to ASP: Truck!Ship
Bullet Punctures
Container Detonation Fire
Ammo ship to ASP NA NA 1.00E-08
Crane! Forklift to
Truck NA NA NA
Forklift to Ship NA NA NA
Truck to ASP NA NA NA
Truck to Port 1.00E-12 1.00E-10 NA
Missile Attack Pallet Falls Pierside Fire
Ammo ship to ASP 1.00E-08 1.00E-12 NA
Crane! Forklift to
Truck NA 1.00E-12 1.00E-08
orklift/Cr to Ship NA 1.00E-08 1.00E-08
Truck to ASP 1.00E-08 1.00E-10 NA
Truck to Port NA NA NA
Reaction with Cargo Reaction with ltems Shaped ChargeAttack
Ammo ship to ASP 1.00E-08 NA NA
Crane! Forklift to
Truck 1.00E-08 NA NA
orklift/Crane to Ship 140E-08 NA NA 
Truck to ASP NA 1.00E-06 1.00E-08
Truck to Port NA NA NA
145
146
17
14R
-di • Al
150
151
152
153
154
REFERENCES
1. Online Bxecutive Development Program — llT Delhi and Macmillan lndia
collaboration, http://www.develop.emacmillan.com/iitd,  viewed on April 24, 2004.
2. S. Pochard, "Managing Risks of Supply-Chain Disruptions: Dual Sourcing as a Real
Option ", Masters Thesis, Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology, August 2003.
3. Y. Sheffi, "Supply Chains and Terrorism", http://web.mit.edu , viewed on April 24,
2004.
4. N. Bahr, "System Safety Bngineering and Risk Assessment: A Practical Approach",
Published by Taylor and Francis Ltd.
5. W. Geoffrey, S. Robert, "Risk Analysis Techniques", Disaster Recovery Journal
1997.
6. T. Bedford and R. Cooke, "Probabilistic Risk Analysis: Foundations and Methods",
Published by Cambridge University Press.
7. V. DeGiorgio, "Understanding Your RlSK, The RlSK Assessment Process", Power
Point Presentation, www.nepss.org/presentations/Risk_26June02.ppt,  viewed on
April 29, 2004.
8. Air Force System Safety Handbook, United States Air Force Safety Agency, July
2000.
9. B. Jenkins, "Security Risk Analysis and Management, Countermeasures lnc", 1998.
10. "A Method to Assess the Vulnerability of U.S. Chemical Facilities", National
lnstitute of Justice, Nov 2002, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij.
11. H. Forbes, "Supply Chain Security", Presented in the Symposium of Bconomic and
Business security held at New Jersey lnstitute of Technology, July 2002.
12. "Making The Nation Safer: Role of Science and Technology for Countering
Terrorism", National Research Council, 2002.
13. "Vulnerability Assessment and Survey Program — Overview of Assessment
Methodology", US Department of Bnergy, Office of Bnergy Assurance, September
2001.
14. Bxecutive Report on behalf of Department of Transport, Local Government and the
Regions, Cranfield University, January 2002.
155
156
REFERENCES
(Continued)
15. M. Swiatocha and J. Bentivoglio, "Conducting a Clinical Compliance Risk
Assessment in Pharmaceutical Industry", Presentation to 2nd Armual Medical
Research, March 2002.
16. B. Bestercy, K. Collier, and J. Davidson, S. Lee, D. Smith, "Logistics Outsourcing
and the Future War Fighting Bnvironment: Risk and Control", Advanced
Management Program, June 2001.
17. "Vulnerability Assessment Worksheet", Municipal Police Officer's Bducation and
Training Commission, http://www.mpoetc.state.pa.us .
18. L. Hudson, B. Ware, K. Laskey, S. Mahoney, "An Application of Bayesian Networks
to Antiterrorism Risk Management for Military Plarmers", submitted to UAl, 2002
19. B. Ware, L. Hudson, R. Kerr, "A Knowledge-Based Simulation Architecture for
Assessing and Managing Risk", Digital Sandbox, Inc., 2001.
20. http://www.buddysystem.net/html/news.shtmlBuddy,
 as viewed on May 2003.
21. Los Alamos National Laboratories, Website as on 4th
 April 2003, http://www.lanl.gov
/quarterly/sim_science.shtml.
22. J. Martha and S. Prabhakaran, "Targeting a Just-ln —Time Supply Chain for the
lnevitable Next Disaster ", Supply Chain Management Review, September 2002.
23. H. Omar, C. Robert, "Securing the Supply Chain", Council of Logistics Management,
2002.
24. Business Continuity and Supply Chain Management, Survey Report, The Chartered
Management lnstitute, London, www.thebci.org , as on March 15, 2003.
25. L. Widmer, "Terrorism lnsurance: Where's the Coverage?", http://www.riskand
insurance.com, as viewed on April 29, 2004
26. J. Sharp, "Origins and Current State of Art in Risk and Business Continuity
Management", www.thebci.org/BCAWKAl.htm,
 as on February 2, 2003
27. http://www.business-continuity-world.com/bia.htm,
 as viewed on April 25, 2003.
28. N. Ross, "Terrorism: How Will lt Impact Contingency Plarming?", Contingency
Plarming & Management, September, 2001, pp14-17.
157
REFERENCES
(Continued)
29. G. Gilbert and M. Gips, "Supply —Side Contingency Plarming", March 2000.
30. "Bnterprise Risk Management Framework", Draft report from Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission.
31. S. Ream, "How Does Your Company Measure Up? The Business Continuity
Management (BCM) Maturity Model", Plarming and Management, Pages 39-41.
32. S. Ream, "Measuring Your Program: 3 Methods for Bvaluating Business Continuity",
Contingency Plarming and Management, November-December 2003, Pages 10-15.
33. L. David, "Adding Art to the Rigor of Statistical Science", Article, New York Times,
April 28, 2001.
34. L. Helm, "lmprobable Inspiration", Article, Los Angeles Times, October 28, 1996.
35. A D Marshall, "Lecture Notes on Baye's Theorem", http://www.cs.cf
ac.uk/Dave/Al2/, as viewed on February 2003.
36. D. Heckerman, A. Mamdani, M. Wellman, "Real World Applications of Bayesian
Networks", Communications of ACM, 1995.
37. P. Haddawy, " An Overview of Some Recent Developments in Bayesian Problem
Solving Techniques", Al Magazine Special lssue on Uncertainty in Al, Summer
1999.
38. A. Phadnis and S. Nasser, "Fuzzy Belief Networks", Powerpoint Presentation,
September 2002.
39. H. Pan ,N. Okello, D. McMichael, M. Roughan, "Fuzzy Causal Probabilistic
Networks and Multisensor Data Fusion", SIPB lnternational Symposium on
Multispectral lmage Processing, October 1998.
40. K. Korb, A. Nicholson, "Bayesian Al Tutorial", Lecture Notes, 2001.
41. A. Said, D. Stevens, G. Sehlke, "Bxploration of Conservation Schemes and TDML
Using Bayesian Networks", March 2002.
42. Neil. Martin, Tranham. Bd, "Using Bayesian Networks to Predict Operational Risk",
Operational Risk, August 2002.
158
REFERENCES
(Continued)
43. H. Pan, D. McMichael, "Fuzzy Causal Probabilistic Networks — A New Ideal And
Practical lnference Bngine", May 1998.
44. D. Heckerman, "Bayesian Networks for Data Mining", Data Mining Knowledge
Discovery 1, 79-119, 1997
45. D. Marshall, "Lecture Notes on Al, Bayes Theorem", September 2002.
46. B. Horstkotte, "Fuzzy Logic", The Net's Original Fuzzy Logic Archive, 2000
47. A. Bonde, "Fuzzy Logic Basics", 2000.
48. A. Blair and B. Ayyub, "Fuzzy Stochastic Cost and Schedule Risk Analysis: MOB
Case Study", 1999.
49. J. Bezdek, " Coments On Fuzzy Sets — What Are They And Why ?", lEBB
transaction on Fuzzy systems , Vol 2 , no 1 , february 1994.
50. U. Lerner, B. Segal, D. Koller, "Bxact lnference in Networks with Discrete Children
of Continuous Parents", 2001.
51. U. Lerner, "Hybrid Bayesian Networks for Reasoning about Complex Systems",
PHd Dissertation, Stanford University, October 2002.
52. M. Meyer, K. Butterfield, W. Murray, R. Smith, J. Booker, "Guidelines for Bliciting
Bxpert Judgment as Probabilities or Fuzzy Logic" , Draft Copy , submitted to Fuzzy
Logic and Probability Applications ,American Statistical Society.
53. R. Keith, "Fuzzy Logic Knowledge Bases in Integrated Landscape Assessment:
Bxamples and Possibilities", General tchnical report PNW-GTR-521, September
2001.
54. M. Stamatelatos, "Probabilistic Risk Assessment: What is it and why is it worth
performing it?", NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.
55. "Standard Practice For System Safety: MlL STD 882D", United States Department of
Defense.
56. P.L. Clements, "Combinatorial Failure Probability Analysis Using MlL- STD 882",
2002, http://www.sverdrup.com/safety/combine.pdf, as viewed on November 2003.
57. Threat Hazard Assessment, SGI Group.
